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Abstract. The paper follows the track of a previous paper “Natural cybernetics of time” 
in relation to history in a research of the ways to be mathematized regardless of being a 
descriptive humanitarian science withal investigating unique events and thus rejecting 
any repeatability. The pathway of classical experimental science to be mathematized 
gradually and smoothly by more and more relevant mathematical models seems to be 
inapplicable. Anyway quantum mechanics suggests another pathway for 
mathematization; considering the historical reality as dual or “complimentary” to its 
model. The historical reality by itself can be seen as mathematical if one considers it in 
Hegel’s manner as a specific interpretation of the totality being in a permanent self-
movement due to being just the totality, i.e. by means of the “speculative dialectics” of 
history, however realized as a theory both mathematical and empirical and thus 
falsifiable as by logical contradictions within itself as emprical discrepancies to facts. 
Not less, a Husserlian kind of “historical phenomenology” is possible along with Hegel’s 
historical dialectics sharing the postulate of the totality (and thus, that of 
transcendentalism). One would be to suggest the transcendental counterpart: an 
“eternal”, i.e. atemporal and aspatial history to the usual, descriptive temporal history, 
and equating the real course of history as with its alternative, actually happened branches 
of the regions of the world as with only imaginable, counterfactual histories. That 
universal and transcendental history is properly mathematical by itself, even in a neo-
Pythagorean model. It is only represented on the temporal screen of the standard 
historiography as a discrete series of unique events. An analogy to the readings of the 
apparatus in quantum mechanics can be useful. Even more, that analogy is considered 
rigorously and logically as implied by the mathematical transcendental history and 
sharing with it the same quantity of information as an invariant to all possible alternative 
or counterfactual histories. One can involve the hypothetical external viewpoint to 
history (as if outside of history or from “God’s viewpoint to it), to which all alternative 
or counterfactual histories can be granted as a class of equivalence sharing the same 
information (i.e. the number choices, but realized in different sequence or adding 
redundant ones in each branch) being similar and even mathematically isomorphic to 
Feynman trajectories in quantum mechanics. Particularly, a fundamental law of 
mathematical history, the law of least choice of the real historical pathway is deducible 
from the same approach. Its counterpart in physics is the well-known and confirmed law 
of least action as far as the quantity of action corresponds equivocally to the quantity of 
information or that of number elementary historical choices.    
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phenomenology, information conservation, mathematical history, natural historical 
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I INTRODUCTION: WHY HISTORY TO BE MATHEMATIZED IS SO DIFFICULT 
History, as it is, is a descriptive, humanitarian, interpretative science withal referring to 
unique, unrepeatable events chosen to be studied because of a certain ideological viewpoint 
though unarticulated as usual. So, history has troubles not only to be mathematized, but even 
to be an objective science. For example, the science of history developed in the state A can 
be quite different form that in the neighboring state B: for this, the A historians is sufficient 
to choose different events to be studied rather than those chosen by their B colleagues. This 
means that history is an interpretative science crucially depending on the choice of the 
scientists who write it. 
However, it is furthermore a humanitarian and social science therefore influenced not less 
crucially by the values, interpretations, minds (speaking more generally) of the actors 
“creating history” or by the public opinion and attitudes, official and generally accepted 
norms and preferences as well as many other subjective factors, agents, media, etc. (e.g. quite 
different in the state A in comparison to the state B). 
Even more, it is a descriptive science “prohibiting the conditional mood”, in which as any 
experiment as any prognosis to the future would be to be thought. This implies further that 
any mathematical models in that “unconditional history” are impossible. Indeed, there exist 
(1) comparative history studying similarity and differences in different countries or 
civilizations, (2) alternative history researching a certain history from another viewpoint (e.g. 
that of other country or civilization or postulating another “reference frame” to the own 
history), or even (3) counterfactual history inherently written in the forbidden “conditional 
mood”. However, all of them rely on a much more unstable base than that of the standard 
history itself too doubtless as a mathematizable or even only objective science. This is the 
reason for the comparative, alternative and especially counterfactual history to be enumerated 
often among the area of literary fiction rather that to that of science. 
To be, anyway, an objective science, history restricts itself only in a standard, preferably 
generally accepted tuple of what “historical facts” are and are to be described in a uniform 
manner: that is history as a science need be “factual historiography” relating only to the facts 
of the past rather than a speculative hermeneutics whether ideological or philosophical. So 
and rather paradoxically, history opposes particularly its objectivity to its eventual 
mathematization, an opposition unique for history among all sciences.  
Still one “anti-mathematical” detail in history: it postulates (and this is justified) for all 
historical events to be unique and even: “the less unique, the less historical”. On the contrary, 
any mathematical model applied in science follows and implies repeatability and 
predictability, or in the terms of the history itself, no historicity in the final analysis.  
Summarizing, history seems to be one of the least suitable science to be mathematized. 
As a paradigm of mathematization, physics (and more exactly quantum mechanics and 
quantum information) will be utilized further in the paper. Thus, a comparison of history to 
physics in relation to the premises for mathematization makes sense: 
History is descriptive, and physics is grounded on a few principles, on an exhaustive list 
of them withal confirmed experimentally without any exceptions. The historical research is 
linked as a discourse, a narrative story unlike the physical one being a deduction to 
confirmable (respectively refutable) corollaries therefore directly interpretable in terms of 
experimental science. 
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History is an interpretative science consequently including interpretations of the 
researcher in the studied facts inseparably and indistinguishably. Thus, history turns out to 
be unique involving “two times”: once for the historical events are unique in definition, twice 
for the individuality of the researcher nuancing the facts by it.  
On the contrary, physics considers any fact claiming to be physical as repeatable and 
absolutely independent of any human interpretation including that of the scientist who 
investigates. However, one should mean furthermore the troubles about the establishment of 
quantum mechanics referred also to the way and entity (“wave function”, for example) able 
to be repeatable (since the single results of quantum measurements turning out to be 
fundamentally random)1.  
History is a humanitarian science, and thus based on human free will, and physics is a 
natural science postulating necessity, investigating natural laws, and building a form of 
cognition independent in the sense of invariance to human free will2. 
        
II THE “NATURAL CYBERNETICS OF TIME” 
In the middle of the 20th century, Norbert Wiener suggested the idea of a new science, 
“cybernetics”, a science studying the general laws of control and communication in 
biological and technical systems. It was related to social systems very soon, to any systems 
at all as “systemology” and it is the base of the contemporary computer science, 
neuroscience, cognitive science, etc. 
Its revolutionary approach unifies the concepts of “system”, “control”, “communication”, 
and “information”, on the one hand, but neglects whether the systems are biological or social, 
or technical, or theoretical and abstract, or any others as well as whether they are the models 
of systems or the real systems themselves, on the other hand.  
So, “system” becomes even a philosophical category, though implemented in a rigorously 
defined scientific notion, able to resolve the philosophical dualism of Modernity (e.g. “body” 
versus “mind” or “subject” versus “object”) by mathematical isomorphism, i.e. as two 
different interpretations of the same, namely “system”. 
Thus, the concept of system turns out to be for science what the “totality” for philosophy 
is. For example, it generates an image of environment in the system and by itself, due only 
to the definitive property of being a system properly. 
However, its revolution was restricted, not referring to physics, history, and not 
connecting to the research of the totality in philosophy, e.g. in Kant’s transcendentalism or 
Hegel’s dialectics, in Husserl’s phenomenology or Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics. It utilized mathematics only as a tool (just as classical science did), but not 
considering it as a system to be investigated as such and thus, absolutely divided from the 
research of the foundations of mathematics undertaken by mathematics to ground its 
consistent completeness, i.e. considering itself as a system implicitly and intending to prove 
this. 
                                                            
1 There exist even philosophical speculations reckoning the observer or experimenter (or their 
consciousness) of any quantum measurement as a “hidden variable” able to determine additionally 
and unambiguously the result. 
2 That relation of physics to free will is revised in a certain rigorous meaning established by the “free 
will theorems” (Conway, Kochen 2006; 2009) based on a few statements in quantum mechanics and 
special relativity.  
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Meanwhile, quantum mechanics reformulated itself as an informational theory 
thoroughly in the end of the last century: the theory of quantum information. A concept of 
cybernetics, namely “information” was proclaimed to be natural, as “quantum information”, 
and then heralded as the most general and omnipresent substance of the world while energy 
and matter can be defined restrictively physically, only to the “temporal screen of the being” 
(i.e. interpreting Heidegger’s “Sein” and “Zeit” in a rigorous physical and mathematical 
manner in accordance to both transcendentalism and dialectics both physical and 
mathematical as in: Penchev 2020 October 20).  
An immense area of research, including experimental, was open: that of quantum 
information and the phenomena of entanglement and resulting particularly into “dark matter” 
and “dark energy” absolutely unexplainable by the Standard model of the contemporary 
quantum physics identifying the temporal screen of the physical being with the physical being 
by itself: i.e. incapable to see what is “behind the temporal screen”, where quantum 
information and phenomena of entanglement would be to be situated and appearing only as 
Plato’s “shadows” projected on the “wall of the space-time cave”.  
So, time, on the “wall screen” of which all is well-ordered (even in a rigorous 
mathematical meaning), implies a physical and not less mathematical cybernetics, however 
at the cost of cancelling the option for studying anything out of the “space-time cave”. 
The mathematical counterpart of the projection on the “cave wall” is the well-known and 
elementarily provable equivalence of the well-ordering “theorem” and the axiom of choice 
therefore physically relating time (as the “quantity of well-ordering”) to information (as the 
“quantity of choices”. 
Just that natural cybernetics of time is the correct viewpoint to history to be mathematized 
consequently researching the informational laws of mathematical history: a thesis advocated 
by the present paper as a main objectivity.    
III THE TOTALITY: TIME AND INFORMATION 
The conjectured quantities of time and information can be tracked back to the totality 
once it has been introduced explicitly by a rigorous and formal way, so verifiable (and not 
less falsifiable) by its corollaries whether checking their logical consistency in mathematics 
or testing them experimentally in physics. 
So, if the totality is granted as what contains its externality in its internality and therefore 
generates a fundamental doubling by itself and meant by the concept and quantity of 
information, time corresponds to the projection of information only on the “screen of 
internality” as well-ordering (including the rigorous mathematical meaning of “well-
ordering”). 
If one defines the units of that fundamental, physical and mathematical time, starting from 
the units of information, a bit, that unit of time can be defined in turn as the “result of a bit 
of information” as the mapping of a bit of information into a certain bijection (among two 
possible ones, totally).  
That unit of time can be visualized by the record either “0” or “1” in a tape sell of Turing 
machine and thus by the executions of any elementary operation of Turing machine: so, it 
can be defined as the class of execution of Turing machine, quantum computer, and 
consequently by the result of quantum measurement or by the process of de-coherence in 
general.  
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Thus, the unit of time would be to be defined fundamentally and physically as information 
(i.e. quantum information for the consideration is physical) being a “unit of de-coherence” 
(which is a volume in the imaginary domain of Minkowski space and thus, a “subluminal 
volume”, i.e. a volume as a function of time in Euclidean space). That kind of definition 
implies for the unit of time to be correlative to the Bekenstein bound meaning the same after 
the substitution of energy by time3 (the latter is used here). Thus, the Bekenstein bound 
suggests that the “temporal screen” of the totality more relevant to the present research 
directed to mathematical history developing in time is equivalent to the “energetic screen” of 
the totality postulated in physics (even in quantum mechanics) by energy conservation.  
The same fundamental unit of time originating directly from the totality can be defined 
mathematically as the mapping of Hilbert arithmetic into Peano arithmetic (Penchev 2020 
August 25) determined in virtue of the “same number”, i.e. by the mapping of a bit of 
information into a the unit (“1”) of Peano arithmetic.  
The totality implies the unit of time even formally and logically if one utilizes the 
fundamental tautology (FT) referring to the logical equivalence of the totality and a bit of 
information (Penchev 2020 October 20), namely: 
"A is true" ⇔ {[(A ⇒ B) ⇎ (A ⇒ ¬B)] ⇔ [(A ⇔ A) ⇔ (B ⇎ ¬B)]} 
Then: 
"𝐴𝐴 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡" ≝ "𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹" ⇒ [(A ⇒ B) ⇎ (A ⇒ ¬B)] 
Accordingly, the logical expression for the projection of the totality onto the “temporal 
screen” can be represented by the omission of the equivalent counterpart, [(A ⇔ A) ⇔
(B ⇎ ¬B)], on the one hand, and the reduction of logical equivalence to implication (i.e. the 
omission of the reverse implication linking what can be interpreted as the “totality” to what 
can be interpreted as a “bit of information”).  
Not less, the logical description of that temporal projection of the totality can serve as a 
logical description of complementarity in quantum mechanics: indeed, the projection cancels 
the dual counterpart, [(A ⇔ A) ⇔ (B ⇎ ¬B)], however the cancelled expression is 
equivalent to the rest available counterpart, [(A ⇒ B) ⇎ (A ⇒ ¬B)], which represents the 
“temporal screen”. Thus, the temporal image of the totality understood formally and logically 
is the same as the totality and incomplete to the totality simultaneously, but in a consistent 
and perfectly faultless way. In other words, the complementary in quantum mechanics 
manages to express the same as Hegel’s dialectics, but without any contradiction to formal 
logic (to propositional logic, more precisely).  
This is a very important necessary condition to be established mathematical history and 
elucidating the necessity of a model originating from quantum mechanics: history needs the 
totality to be theoretical, but in a consistent way, to be mathematical. Fortunately, quantum 
mechanics has resolved the problem for the totality to be meant in a mathematical and 
logically faultless formalism and which can be borrowed and only adapted by history trying 
to become mathematical.   
The Cartesian dualism of the modern Western philosophy and science, fundamental for 
its episteme (“episteme” in the sense of Foucault) and cognition even until now does not 
admit particularly any unification of the speculative ontology and empirical science 
                                                            
3 That is by means of the Planck constant. 
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furthermore experimental and based on mathematical models. They are separated by still the 
same abyss between the “mind” (of speculative ontology) and the “body” (of empirical 
science).  
However, the establishment of mathematical history needs the unity of Hegel’s 
speculative ontology of dialectics and relevant mathematical models. Quantum mechanics 
being an experimental and mathematized science has found a way out of Descartes’s dilemma 
and thus, out of the modern episteme including that underlying the contemporary empirical 
science.  
So, the present paper following the paradigm of quantum mechanics as literally as a 
general direction violates also the dogma for speculative ontology (particularly, Hegel’s 
dialectic or Kant’s transcendentalism in its base) not to be unified or even only considered 
together with any part of empirical science.  
Further, still a few examples of that “heretical”, non-Cartesian unification will be 
suggested, namely: in relation to Husserl’s phenomenology (as “historical and mathematical 
phenomenology”) as well as in relation to Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s hermeneutics4 (as 
“historical and mathematical hermeneutics”). 
The introduction of the “fundamental unit of time” as above, in a formal and logical way 
is simultaneously a relevant occasion for the “hermeneutical circle” being fundamental in 
hermeneutics to be considered also formally and logically in accordance with, or as a 
formalized speculative counterpart of the fundamental unit of time. 
The hermeneutic circle understood as the “vicious circle” of classical logic is not more 
than a redundant tautology incapable to prove anything remaining equally problematic with 
or without it. If it is referred to the “excluded middle” of classical logic, Hegel’s triad can be 
considered as its counterpart violating the law of non-contradiction (e.g. after the “excluded 
third” and “non-contradiction” are equivalent Boolean expressions).    
Not less reasonably or formally, it can be considered as the exemplification of the other 
fundamental law of classical logic: the law of identity, that is as a “vicious circle”, after which 
the premise implies the conclusion as well as the conclusion implies the premises, and thus, 
the conclusion and the premise are logically equivalent, i.e. an exemplification of the law of 
identity in the final analysis (the hermeneutical circle though notable equivalently by both 
premise and conclusion is identical to itself).  
Here is how the fundamental tautology via the logical expression of the “unit of time” 
allows for the hermeneutical circle not to be interpreted as a trivial tautology and thus as 
absolutely redundant:  
1. The hermeneutic circle exemplifies the equivalence of the totality and a bit of 
information just according to the “fundamental tautology” where the “totality” is meant as a 
hermeneutic circle, and a “bit of information” means the hermeneutical premise and 
conclusion. 
  
                                                            
4 The expression “Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s hermeneutics” means as Heidegger’s hermeneutics as 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics as two separate philosophical doctrines though related to each other closely. 
The “father” of modern dualism, Descartes (as well as Leibnitz) being both great philosopher and 
great mathematician gave an example for following: how speculative ontology and mathematical 
theories can be developed in parallel and thus unified in a single mind. 
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2. The fundamental unit of time can be defined equivalently so:  
"𝐴𝐴 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡" ≝ "𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹" ⇒ [(A ⇔ A) ⇔ (B ⇎ ¬B)] 
This equivalent definition is in virtue of the “FT” itself, and the conclusion, [(A ⇔ A) ⇔
(B ⇎ ¬B)], can be granted as a logical definition of “hermeneutical circle” (“HC”) meaning 
that it can be considered as the dual counterpart of the “unit of time” as the latter is defined 
logically by  [(A ⇒ B) ⇎ (A ⇒ ¬B)], i.e. by a well-ordering “step of time”. In other words, 
the “hermeneutical circle” as a “unit of time” would correspond to the option of any of both 
choices as a dual unit of time; or briefly:  
"𝐴𝐴 (𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑) 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡" ≝ "𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹" ⇒ "HC" 
The concept of hermeneutical circle can be visualized in terms of Turing machine so: the 
transition to the next tape cell is an equivalent (or dual) unit (“step”) of time to the record of 
either “0” or “1” in the current tape cell. In other words, the execution of any single 
elementary operation of Turing machine defines the same unit of time in it. 
   
IV BOTH TRANSCENDENTALISM AND DIALECTICS ORIGINATING FROM 
THE POSTULATE OF THE TOTALITY 
A few previous papers (Penchev 2020 October 20; 2020 August 25; 2020 October 5; 2020 
October 19) have elucidated already the way for both transcendentalism and dialectics to 
originate from the totality withal in the present context, i.e. as scientific (i.e. falsifiable) 
hypotheses rather than as philosophical doctrines “metaphysical” in the sense of Popper.  
What remains is the properly historical or temporal aspect meant rather by dialectics than 
by transcendentalism (though it implies the former) explicitly: the historical totality to be 
defined in a way rigorous and similar to that of the mathematical totality (as the consistent 
completeness of mathematics) or the physical totality (the universe).  
The historical totality moves itself by itself as dialectics makes clear. The frontier of 
historical time (as that of time at all) moves itself by itself forward (and never backward, i.e. 
time arrow is meant). However furthermore, the historical totality would be to contain its 
externality, which is the future, in its internality, which is the past. In other words, the 
historical totality as transcendental implies for the past to be doubled (unlike the frontier of 
the present remaining an “immovable point” in the meaning to coincide with its counterpart 
in definition). 
However, the usual approach to history considers the past to be single and unchangeable 
rather than doubled in virtue of necessity to contain the future thoroughly into itself. In fact 
historical time is meant only as a memory, available in the present moment, of all “previous 
present moments”5. This convention being as if an obvious postulate should be declared as 
“false” to the historical totality and thus, to the “mathematical history” as it is intended in the 
present paper.    
                                                            
5 The expression “all previous present (1) moments as a memory in a certain present (2) moment“ (as 
well as the motion of the immovable point of the frontier of time) is not a “Hegelian oxymoron” (or a 
logical contradiction) since it means a well-ordered set of different (in general) states of the same, i.e. 
in a formally and logically consistent way: “present (1)” and present (2) (to which “previous” is 
determined) are different disjunctively (as well as “motion” and “immovable” can be distinguished 
as defined in relevant different relations).     
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Immediately and formally, that “second history” underlain by the “second historical time” 
would refer to the reversed time arrow. However, that definition is not fruitful because it is 
either inaccessible (by itself) or cancelling historicity (together with the “normal” time 
arrow). Fortunately, it can be approached indirectly by the “hermeneutical fundamental unit 
of time” (as above) meaning formally and logically that reversed time arrow.  
In fact, hermeneutics means always a certain interpretation determined by a certain 
individual or group interpreter in a certain moment of the normal time arrow. The sense of 
that interpretation seen just according to the normal time arrow is а “value field” making 
certain alternative (abstractly being equally probable) of historical choices much more 
probable than others (abstractly being also equally probable). That field deforms any certain 
historical choice hermeneutically since the historical actors choose in accordance to their 
value system.  
The mathematical description of that value field as a “second history” however following 
in the direction of the “first history” (that of the historical events) is a necessary condition 
for the establishment of mathematical history (able to predict though probabilistically, but in 
a rigorous way, as quantum mechanics does).    
Summarizing, the historical totality is doubled just as the mathematical totality or the 
physical totality, or the properly philosophical totality. The image of the historical future is 
given hermeneutically in it: as a value field predetermining the historical choices partly and 
probabilistically.       
  
V THE ORIGIN OF THE 20TH CENTURY’S PHENOMENOLOGY AND 
HERMENEUTICS FROM THE TOTALITY 
One can find (rather speculatively, in an only philosophical way independent of the 
available empirical and historical confirmation) two elements in European philosophy even 
since Ancient Greek one: the totality in the dawn of philosophy in Pythagorean school and 
the pre-Socratics and the human being after Socrates. Both can be seen already synthesized 
in Plato into the “ideas” if one considers (for example) the sacral Pythagorean Number 
referring to the totality by itself (and thus divine and sacral for the human beings) as the Plato 
idea (already desacralized or “profane” once it is available in the human beings): in other 
words, the one element, the totality, turns out to be synthesized with the other element, the 
human being by means of ideas as what the totality represents within the human being.  
The philosophical foundations of mathematical history needs for that synthesis to be made 
explicit for mathematics has to be unify with the humanitarian history of human beings 
possessing free will. The unification is researched by the category of possibility (and 
probability) shared by both mathematics and free will rather than on the base of the 
opposition of necessity and free will (sometimes alleged to be Kantian). 
Descartes’s dualism being in the beginning of the modern European philosophy added 
the postulate of the gap between the body and the mind, the human being and reality: an 
abyss in the totality making it impossible at least to human cognition, and surmountable only 
by God being the Totality by Himself. Thus, the Socratic “human being” is linked to the pre-
Socratic “totality” even in a mystic Pythagorean way, but permanently, in any act of thought 
overcoming the abyss between the body and the mind somehow (for example by God’s Help).   
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Mathematical history would not be possible after Cartesian dualism for it should be 
situated into the inaccessible abyss of the desacralized human cognition (or God’s Will of 
theology) therefore being not less inaccessible (or accessible only mystically).    
The “Copernican revolution” of Kant’s transcendentalism restored the totality already in 
human cognition inferring its definitive properties and postulating it implicitly by them. 
Hegel’s dialectics and dialectics of history, particularly, appeared immediately once 
transcendentalism had overcome the Cartesian abyss. 
Indeed, mathematical history is rather relevant to physical and mathematical dialectics 
than to dualism.  
Husserl’s phenomenology generated a few fundamental innovations in the philosophical 
doctrine of the totality following the general direction of European philosophy as ancient as 
modern. However, he did not relate his doctrine to history and historical cognition directly 
and explicitly: an approach and application of phenomenology to history was elaborated as 
philosophical hermeneutics by Heidegger and Gadamer (rather as a methodology of history 
by the latter). 
One can demonstrate (as the present research will conjecture) that the implicit approach 
of Husserl’s phenomenology to history and that of Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
(or an inverse “dialectics of origin” after the former) can be seen as both related and opposite, 
and thus complimentary in a wider sense. 
For this purpose, a new kind of Husserlian reduction, historical reduction can be defined 
as well as well its close link to existentialism6 once “historical phenomenon” be reduced to 
the present. To be justified the introduction of “historical reduction”, a reinterpretation of 
Husserl’s eidetic, phenomenological, and transcendental reduction in the context of as the 
development of European philosophy being a doctrine of the totality as the idea of 
mathematical history is necessary.  
“Eidetic reduction” can be seen as a mathematical reduction as an interpretation of the 
fundamental and basic “transcendental reduction” therefore connecting transcendentalism to 
mathematics (in a way different form that of physical and mathematical transcendentalism, 
but presumably linkable to it) by back reflection. In contemporary terms, eidetic reduction is 
able to generate the “eidos” (or idea) as the class of equivalence of all interpretations of the 
same class, a “thing” being objectified withal starting from interpretations (even from a single 
one): thus, eidetic reduction postulates that interpretations implies its idea whether formally 
and logically or loosely (i.e. “philosophically”).  
Eidetic reduction can be found as the “category” of the mathematical theory of categories, 
i.e. as a certain mathematical structure defined axiomatically. The theory of categories 
investigates first of all the morphisms of categories therefore reaching to the eventual 
consistent completeness of physical and mathematical transcendentalism in virtue of the 
postulate that the theory of categories can be investigated as a category and thus, absolutely 
in its own framework. 
However, the concept of eidetic reduction means a rather different relation to 
transcendentalism as the eidos can be understood as a transcendental totality containing the 
externality of its interpretations within itself as a necessary nucleus of any possible 
interpretation. Then, the postulate of eidetic reduction adds that one can obtain that nucleus 
                                                            
6 Heidegger rejected to be an “existentialist”, for example in Heidegger @. 
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constructively removing all variable (accidental) properties one by one in virtue of their 
variability, but conserving all unchangeable (essential) properties as definitive (or 
mathematically, axiomatic) in relation to the “eidos” (i.e. that definitive or axiomatic essence, 
the nucleus of properties) of the “thing” (i.e. all possible variations or interpretations adding 
accidental, variable properties to the “essence”).  
One can apply further the postulate of eidetic reduction to any real historical process in 
order to acquire its definitive and unchangeable eidos. An additional postulate can identify 
any historical event with just one property of the historical process. Then, the eidos would 
represent a series of definitive events available in that process wherever it occur: in any 
alternative or counterfactual historical process to that at issue.  
Furthermore, the same nuclear series of events would be a mathematical structure in 
virtue of what eidetic reduction is. Summarizing, the postulate of eidetic reduction can justify 
the option of mathematical history studying the eidoi of historical processes as mathematical 
structures. However, that consideration does not suggest any method how an eidos can be 
constructed starting from a given history. 
“Phenomenological reduction” to “phenomenon” (in the sense of Husserl’s 
phenomenology) can be accomplished by “epoché” or the “bracketing of reality”: one 
abandons the question whether the entity at issue is real (i.e. belonging to reality) or not. 
Phenomenological reduction can be understood and consequently formalized in a few 
different ways: 
1. It removes the doubling of anything as being both in the human being (or the subject, 
or the “mind”) and reality (or being an object, a “body”) therefore reducing it to its 
phenomenon. The fundamental, formal and logical tautology equating the totality to a bit of 
information is relevant to it. Furthermore, it follows the tradition of the modern Western 
philosophy and particularly the mind-body problem of dualism interpreting the totality and 
transcendentalism in its terms.  
2. However, it can be interpreted quite otherwise not less relevantly: one abandons the 
question whether the entity at issue is itself (among a class of entities consisting of as other 
existing, i.e. alternative entities as non-existing, i.e. counterfactual entities). In other words, 
one achieves the eidos (as that class) of the entity (belonging to the class), i.e. therefore by 
“eidetic reduction” coinciding with the “phenomenological reduction” in the present meaning 
(and unlike the former meaning “1”). 
As to terms of mathematical history, one would be to mean a class of histories as 
alternative as counterfactual, to which the real history belongs. The class is definable e.g. by 
two historical events shared by all histories whether alternative or counterfactual, or the real 
one: all possible historical pathways connecting smoothly in time two events (i.e. as ordered 
in time) constitutes the class which would be the phenomenon (in this meaning) of the meant 
real history.  
A fundamental difference between two meanings of “phenomenon” (respectively, of 
“phenomenological reduction”) is obvious even still formally and mathematically: the 
meaning “1” doubles and thus generates a bijection, representable as a whole by a bit of 
classical information, unlike “2” juxtaposing to the one single, “real” element a set of 
arbitrarily many (thus, infinite in general) alternative or counterfactual entities, representable 
as a whole as a qubit of quantum information. 
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If one need identify the two meanings, a bit of information has to be equated to a qubit of 
quantum information: a statement that can be proved even rigorously, formally and 
mathematically by the mediation of Hilbert arithmetic, and then, by its identification with the 
separable complex Hilbert space of quantum mechanics7 (Penchev 2020 August 25). Then, 
“wave function” both transfinite natural number in Hilbert arithmetic and state of quantum 
system would the phenomenon of the entity at issue, and therefore unifying the two meanings 
as follows: 
“Wave function” can be interpreted as the characteristic function of a relevant probability 
density distribution (including Dirac’s 𝛿𝛿-function particularly), the maximal value of which 
(corresponding to the most probable entity) would refer to the “real” entity (particularly to 
the single real entity if the Dirac function is the case) and this corresponds to a qubit as the 
value of quantum information.  
Furthermore, the pair of the wave function and its dual wave function corresponds to the 
doubling, and thus, to a single bit of classical information, on the one hand, and to the 
meaning “1” of “phenomenon” acquired by “phenomenological reduction”, on the other 
hand. 
Seen so, phenomenological reduction generalizes eidetic reduction (isomorphic to the 
meaning “2”) by the doubling (corresponding to the meaning “1”). 
Husserl emphasized that the third reduction, “transcendental reduction” is the same as 
phenomenological reduction, but now one can interpret the sense of the “same” much more 
precisely, i.e. by the identification of phenomenological reduction and eidetic reduction as 
above: the meaning “1” related to reality (or not less to the “mind”) because the totality is 
the “same” as the meaning “2”  referring to a state of the totality or to a transfinite natural 
number in Hilbert arithmetic therefore thinkable as a (well-ordered) state of infinity.  
Then, the “global space” of the totality meant by Hilbert arithmetic is the “same” as the 
local space of the totality meant in any entity and meant by quantum mechanics. 
Consequently, the identification inferred from “transcendental reduction” implies in turn 
the foundations of mathematics (as Hilbert arithmetic) and the foundations of physics (as 
quantum mechanics) to be merged: this links physics and mathematics to be interpretable 
thoroughly by each other. 
If one manages to prove that the foundations of history can be added to those merged 
foundations of both physics and mathematics, and all the three in the primary totality of the 
philosophy, the intended establishment of mathematical history would be achieved.  
Then, “historical reduction” will mean (in definition) the “same” (analogical to that 
“same” linking phenomenological and transcendental reduction) as transcendental reduction 
but directed to history and its foundations to be seen philosophically, by the totality, but not 
less formally and mathematically, thus merged in physical and mathematical 
transcendentalism.  
Particularly, historical reduction is directed to achieve a third interpretation of wave 
function together with the available already two ones as: (1) transfinite natural number; and 
                                                            
7 Physical and mathematical transcendentalism implies that a properly physical equivalent of that 
equation of a bit to a qubit is necessary to exist, and this is the Schrödinger equation, the basic one 
for quantum mechanics: one conjecture partly justified in previous papers (Penchev 2020 July 10; 
2020 August 25), but still awaiting in the queue of future research to be articulated explicitly in detail 
and rigorously, formally and mathematically.  
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(2) a quantum state according to quantum mechanics. That interpretation should mean the 
exhaustive description of all the class of counterfactual or alternative histories to the real 
history: mathematical history is possible only to that class immediately, and to the real history 
only by means of it.  
Speaking loosely, one can say that the way for history to be mathematized is opposite to 
that of natural science: the real history can be delivered from its mathematical model by 
“taking away” alternative and counterfactual histories unlike the reality of any natural science 
which is “more” than its mathematical model and can be achieved starting from it only adding 
new and new accidental properties to the model, an infinite set of accidental properties in 
general.  
That approach for history to be mathematized, made this so difficult and opposed to that 
of natural science, can be realized also introducing a hypothetical viewpoint (and a 
corresponding observer attachable to it) external to the totality, i.e. as if “outside of it”. 
Indeed, the totality in definition contains an equivalent counterpart of it, however within 
itself.  
Anyway, the external observer as the observer’s counterpart within the totality and the 
actually internal observer can be distinguished by what each of them would see as the relation 
of model and reality. The reality for the inherently internal observer would be “more” than 
any mathematical models needing an infinite set of additional properties in general to be 
achieved, but “less” to the internal twin of the “transcendent observer”, i.e. ostensibly 
“outside of the totality”.  
That reality less than its model would be a certain history, i.e. a series of anything, but 
well-ordered in time necessarily as successive temporal states of that “anything”. Thus, the 
model, if that is the case, would be the class of all possible histories. 
In comparison with that necessary innovation for history to be mathematized, what the 
inherently internal observer utilized any mathematical model to the observed reality would 
see is that, on the contrary, reality is all possible models. 
Those two alternative statements can be unified as “ontological invariance” meaning that 
the change between “external observer” to the totality and “internal observer” within it is 
equivalent to the change of the relation of “reality” and “model” to the relation of “part” and 
“whole”: that is “reality” is “part” to “model” as to “external observer”, but “model” is “part” 
to “reality” as to internal viewpoint.  
The latter worldview has been standard until now, but it does not allow for history to be 
mathematized in any way. This is possible only after the change of Gestalt to the former 
worldview and meant in the present paper in the framework of the generalization consisting 
of both.  
One can notice that the worldview of quantum mechanics is situated exactly on the border 
of both worldviews. This is proved as the well-known theorems of the absence of hidden 
variables in quantum mechanics (Neumann 1932; Kochen, Specker 1968)@ interpretable 
also as the coincidence of “model” and “reality” being definitive for quantum mechanics. 
Obviously, the coincidence of “model” and “reality” is just the common border shared by the 
class of all classical ontologies being “convex” to any model and nonstandard being “convex” 
to any reality (i.e. “concave” to the model). This makes clear, particularly, why the mediation 
of quantum mechanics (being on the border) is necessary for delivering mathematical history. 
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The historical reality (meaning mathematical history as its background) corresponds to 
the fundamentally random single measurement of quantum mechanics and empirically 
accessible only by the readings of the so-called apparatus. If one had involved a nonstandard 
quantum mechanics describing the “apparatus” (unlike the standard one studying the 
microscopic quantum entity rather than the apparatus), it would be isomorphic (i.e. equivalent 
mathematically) to mathematical history.  
An analog of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics as to mathematical 
history would be possible and might be called the many-models interpretation of 
mathematical history: each model of them would generate an alternative history. The last 
observation can serve as a narrative link to the discussion of Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics in terms of the sketch above about historical reduction withal mathematical: 
any model can be interpreted as a state of the “value field” predetermining historical choice 
partly and probabilistically in general. 
To define “philosophy as a rigorous science” (in fact, in relation to the paradigm of logic 
and mathematics as rigorous sciences), Husserl introduced the temporal “stream of 
consciousness”, to which philosophy once being rigorous should refer. That rigorous 
philosophy is to order necessarily well (i.e. as a well-ordered temporal series) the unordered 
atemporal and aspatial logical and mathematical truths (or theorems as phenomena) in virtue 
of what consciousness is: a stream.   
The “eternal” logic and mathematics (or the “eternal” philosophy, on the other hand) are 
reflected on the stream (temporal) screen of consciousness as the intended “rigorous 
philosophy”. By the way, that “rigorous philosophy” would be to be falsifiable, particularly, 
once it claims to be verifiable (as rigorous). Then, the mentioned physical and mathematical 
transcendentalism, physical and mathematical dialectics, historical and mathematical 
phenomenology or hermeneutics, etc., all of them being falsifiable definably, would be to be 
considered in the area of rigorous philosophy, i.e. by means of the same stream of 
consciousness implying their fundamental falsifiability. 
History meant standardly is a temporal series always. Historical reduction (as introduced 
above) is an interpretation of the abstract and general transcendental reduction to history, and 
thus, implies the unity of “historical eidos” and “historical phenomenon” as to any temporal 
series meant by history as usual.   
That “historical phenomenon” originating from the transcendental doubling after a kind 
of “historical epoché bracketing reality” (which means historical factuality or counter-
factuality) is temporal inherently.  
Unlike it, “historical eidos” introduces the set of all real and counterfactual histories as a 
single element utilizing relevantly mathematical concepts for mathematical history. Then, 
the mentioned historical unity of both eidos and phenomenon can follow from the 
fundamental mathematical identity of any set (for “historical eidos”) with all elements of it 
(for historical phenomenon). 
However, any history being certain as a temporal series adds additional choice(s) and 
information due to the choice of a certain element among all the elements of the relevant set. 
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That choice is predetermined by the “temporal screen” and its “profile”8, on which a certain 
historical eidos is “projected”. 
Following Husserl’s track, one can think of the “temporal screen of history” as the 
“stream of consciousness of the transcendental subject” being the projection of the “eidos of 
transcendental history” after the specific “screen profile” (for example that of Europe or 
China, etc.). That generalized screen is “curved” by a common, social or civilization value 
field “deforming” all the historic choices according to its preferences without complete 
predetermination, though. 
That social or civilization value field can be inferred in a few independent ways 
distinguishing the present extrapolation of Husserl’s phenomenology to history from 
Heidegger’s or Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, after which the former can be 
interpreted as a kind of “transcendental hermeneutics”: a single, common hermeneutics of 
history interpreting itself by itself or realizing itself in an admissible Hegelian reading of 
Husserl’s phenomenology applied to history.  
That transcendental hermeneutics originates from “transcendental and historic 
invariance” meaning an application of transcendental invariance to history, namely the 
equivalence of any historical process to an atemporal eidos referable and thus shared by all 
the class of alternative and counterfactual historic pathways, to which the given real historic 
process belongs.  The choice of the historical process at issue among the class needs 
additional information, for delivering which the value field is defined.  
Abstractly, it can be considered as reverse causality originating from the future and 
directed to the past determining additionally the standard causality, in terms of which would 
be to be represented as fundamental randomness or “God’s intervention” in human history: 
a relatively insignificant factor along all the human decisions, however, causing the 
bifurcation of historical process in branches and following one of them.  
Hermeneutics discusses alternatively the same factor determined additionally that 
historical process to necessity by fundamental randomness, however interpretable as reverse 
causality in the framework of “historical phenomenology” (as here): 
 The unrecognizable “Will of God” visible as fundamental crucial coincidences of 
historical processes is substituted by human decision justified by a certain state of value field 
in the investigated historical moment. The acting reverse causality of “God’s Will” is 
replaced equivalently by human decisions in virtue of transcendental and historical 
invariance. That course of thought interprets the fundamental randomness of historical 
process as a human decision as if irrelevant to the essence of historical process, i.e. 
insignificant and without realizing its aftermath to historical bifurcation. Anyway, that 
insignificant decisions correspond to value field in that historical age as any human action of 
any person not being “crazy”. 
One can see continuity smoothly transforming human decisions in “God’s Will” and vice 
versa as well as any causality as predetermination, but only post factum, for only the 
happened fact allows for a certain causality to be understood as predetermination unlike many 
other causalities not influencing historical process. That substitution can be realized only post 
                                                            
8 That “profile of the temporal screen” can be visualized by curving the “screen” therefore deforming 
the “images projected on it”. 
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factum because it means always change the reverse causality into causality and thus implies 
the reversion of time arrow.  
Until now, the leading viewpoint was that of historical phenomenology, but it can be 
reversed in turn and not less smoothly to that of historical hermeneutics: 
 The key concepts relevant to the present context are “interpretation” and “hermeneutical 
circle”. Any historical entity (such as a historic fact, event, process, etc.) makes sense only 
as interpreted though the interpretations can be quite different in general. Thus, 
“interpretation” can mean as the class of all interpretations as any certain interpretation. The 
former can be called “abstract interpretation” or “transcendental interpretation”, and the 
latter, “concrete interpretation” or “phenomenological interpretation”.  
“Historical phenomenology” achieved by a Husserlian approach as above is directed 
rather to the transcendental aspect of interpretation (though equivalent to its 
phenomenological aspect in the final analysis after the identification of transcendental and 
phenomenological reduction), i.e. to the historical eidos atemporal, universal or “eternal”, 
seen or visible only from “God’s viewpoint”: the meaning of history as in Frege’s 
“Bedeutung”.  
From the “human viewpoint” inherently empirical or experimental, the same historical 
eidos is observable always and only as exemplified temporally, i.e. as an actual course of 
history clearly distinguishable from any other as well as possible, alternative or 
counterfactual pathway by the participation of the observer in the former case and the non-
participation and indifference of the observer being external definitively in the latter case: in 
other words, the historical eidos once the viewpoint is changed to human is historical 
phenomenon.  
Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s hermeneutics mean rather historical phenomenon though 
equivalent to its eidetic aspect in the final analysis after the identification of transcendental 
and phenomenological reduction. Historical phenomenon and historical eidos are linked and 
identifiable to each other also by the interpretation of the totality as itself by itself 
definitively, in virtue of being namely the “totality”, in which the abstract and transcendental 
interpretation, on the one hand, and the concrete and phenomenological interpretation, on the 
other hand, are merged. 
Hermeneutic circle restores historical eidos in any historical phenomenon by adding the 
reverse time of interpretation (and correspondingly, the reverse causality of interpretation), 
after which any historical entity is interpretable in the present moment being definitively in 
its future.  
From the viewpoint of propositional logic (being atemporal), hermeneutical circle is a 
“vicious circle“ adding at best a redundant tautology to the chain of syllogisms, and thus, 
“cut by Occam’s razor”. The viewpoint of propositional logic delivers (or it is able to deliver) 
only eidos and therefore, historical eidos in particular. 
On the contrary, hermeneutic circle inherently temporal delivers historical phenomenon 
as well as also phenomenon at all (in Husserl’s meaning) after the being is temporalized (as 
in Heidegger’s “Sein und Zeit”). 
The concept of a bit of information may reconcile the viewpoint of propositional logic 
and that of hermeneutics (respectively, the redundant tautology of vicious circle and the 
synthetic and informative postulate of hermeneutic circle) in virtue of the fundamental, 
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formal and logical tautology, particularly able to temporalize the totality by cyclicity (i.e. by 
the cyclic transition to a single bit of information). 
The concept of hermeneutical circle means that tautology, and thus, representable as a 
single bit of information, e.g. as follows: 
Hermeneutic circle can be considered as a specific hermeneutic (or philosophical) “unit” 
introduced only in order to notate the totality formally as a common measure of the totality 
itself and any part of it. “Measure” here (i.e. relation to “hermeneutic circle”) is used rather 
loosely, or philosophically, meaning that the totality definitively (in virtue of being namely 
the “totality”) represents a single quality shared by itself and anything within it. Thus, the 
philosophical concept of measure means only that the “totality” by itself implies the existence 
of an universal and general quality “measurable” just as a certain quality by the conventional 
unit of “hermeneutical circle”. 
However, any shared single quality transferred to be empirical or experimental implies to 
be a quantity as well. On the other hand, the same transferability as to “hermeneutical circle” 
seems to be problematic (at least at first glance) as far as the totality should be neither 
empirical nor experimental, and God’s Viewpoint is granted to be fundamentally different 
and incommensurable with humankind’s. However, the concept of common measure, just 
the “hermeneutical circle” implies for them to be, on the contrary, commensurable. 
Anyway the same philosophical commensurability is not necessary to be interpreted 
furthermore as implying the existence of a certain, empirical or experimental quantity.  
The latter would be to be adopted as an additional axiom in the framework of, or equivalent 
to historical and mathematical transcendentalism summoned to establish mathematical 
history formally and logically, i.e. consistently.  
Once the existence of that quantity shared by the totality (whole) and part be admitted, it 
can be identified as information in virtue of the obvious statement that the two quantities 
sharing the same unit are in turn the same as well: one need prove that the philosophical unit 
of hermeneutical circle (postulated to be transferable to a relevant quantity) is isomorphic to 
bit of information (by the way, the same statement is what is meant by the “fundamental, 
formal and logical tautology”). Anyway, the isomorphism at issue can be demonstrated 
independently, e.g. as follows:  
Hermeneutic circle unifies indistinguishably fact and interpretation as a historical entity 
as well as the normal and reverse time arrows: conventionally, the time of fact can be 
accepted to be “normal”, and, that of interpretation, “reverse” therefore implying the option 
for them to be dividable disjunctively. Then, the unity of fact and interpretation, on the one 
hand, and the distinction of fact from interpretation, on the other hand, constitutes together a 
bit of information9.  
Heidegger’s hermeneutics can be distinguished from that of Gadamer rather conditionally 
by the emphasized aspect: fundamental and referring to the totality rather after Heidegger, 
and properly historical and referring to the interpretable historical fact eventually after 
Gadamer. The latter author explicated the unity of both approaches.   
The specific interest and fruitfulness of Gadamer’s hermeneutics can be generalized by 
the investigation of “value field” predetermining in a certain degree both historical decision 
                                                            
9 One can demonstrate the same isomorphism by a tape cell of Turing machine. For example or 
conventionally, the cell notates ‘hermeneutical circle’, the record of “0”, ‘interpretation’, and “1”, 
‘fact’. 
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and interpretation though possibly in different ways as to any concrete historical fact. Thus, 
the reverse “time of interpretation” is inaccessible empirically in the being of historical fact 
by the “time of historical decision” collinear the “time of fact” granted to be the “normal time 
arrow”, and thus, absolutely cognizable not only post factum.  
That fundamental innovation of Gadamer and its influence as to the establishment of 
mathematical history will be discussed in detail in Section VIII.                                  
                          
VI TO TRANSCEDENTALISM, DIALECTICS, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND 
HERMENEUTICS DEFINED RIGOROUSLY AND SCIENTIFICALLY 
All the mentioned philosophical doctrines originated from the Western philosophical 
category of the totality in turn arisen to resolve the Cartesian dualism. Anyway, the latter was 
conserved in the dichotomy of philosophy (on the “mind” side) and science (on the “body” 
side). Husserl’s idea to transform “philosophy as a rigorous science” does not mean to 
transfer the philosophy from the “mind” side to the “body” side of experience and 
experiments, but on the contrary, to unify them by the concept of the totality, i.e. applying 
once again the concept of the totality to the relation of philosophy and science rather than 
only to the philosophy itself. In other words, though the intention for philosophy to become 
a rigorous science seems to be anti-metaphysical to, and naturalizing philosophy at first 
glance, its essence is just opposite: to make science philosophical and metaphysical.  
As Husserl as Heidegger tried to elucidate the fundamental philosophical meaning of 
“time” by its relation to “consciousness” or “being”. The former, being a mathematician by 
education and initial profession, kept closer links of philosophy to logic, mathematics, and 
science. The later rather opposed them calling Husserl to blame him in “naturalization”, i.e. 
restoring their dualism therefore cancelling the intention of phenomenology to unify them by 
means of the totality. In fact, Heidegger’s time not less than Husserl’s time was related to the 
totality (as Heidegger’s being), but it was considered in a way inconsistent and even 
incommensurable to time in science therefore involving (in “Sein und Zeit”) a new existential 
conception of abstract and philosophical human experience accessible inherently and 
initially, self-obviously to human beings and then, absolutely different to empirical 
experience and experiments in science. That new kind of experience, introduced 
philosophically, was necessary to reconcile it with to the totality in order to be able to be 
fundamental namely in the “fundamental ontology”. 
However, that solution shifted the Cartesian abyss within the experience itself dividing it 
into philosophical experience in fundamental ontology and empirical experience in science. 
That approach is not relevant to the objectivity of the present investigation. 
On the contrary, the solution is researched rather in Husserl’s direction and even on its 
radicalization to the interpretation of philosophical doctrines (such as transcendentalism, 
dialectics, phenomenology, and hermeneutics) as scientific hypotheses or theories therefore 
falsifiable whether formally and logically or experimentally. “Philosophy as a rigorous 
science” seems to mean just that, at least philosophically, metaphorically or as a wish. 
Childishly or naïvely, the intention now is just this and literal: the quoted philosophical 
doctrines to be considered as scientific theories explicitly in a rigorous, formal and logical 
way on the base of relevant definition of the totality:     
The totality is meant as a meta-philosophical category interpreted and exemplified by 
different names and complemented specifically in transcendentalism, dialectics, 
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phenomenology and hermeneutics. Furthermore, it is defined formally as that extremity, thus 
opposed to all being not extremal, which contains its externality in its internality, or doubling 
anything by itself. The boundary between the externality and internality is “immovable’ to 
doubling therefore needing or admitting special consideration.  
The totality defined formally so (but not “formally” in a rigorous and logical meaning) is 
prepared rather to be included in axiomatic tuples (or semi-axiomatic, such a set of principles 
in physics) to be redefined, or more preciously, to be defined additionally by the specific 
relations established in all other items in the corresponding tuples10. 
Only after that and only in that sense, corollaries both falsifiable and verifiable can be 
inferred and checked whether for logical contradiction or experimental refusal.  
In an absolute rigorous meaning, falsifiable statements are only the items in the formal 
tuples. The corresponding ideas meant implicitly or contextually in the axiomatic systems 
are “falsifiable” only in a loose sense being intermediate between the falsifiable scientific 
theories and the metaphysical philosophical doctrines. 
The philosophical doctrines can be considered as an “eternal archive” of ideas and 
opposed to the scientific theories falsifiable in any certain historical moment. Those two 
“poles” suggest an intermediate area between them, each element of which would be to be 
defined as a class (or union) of falsifiable theories so that the refusal of one or more (but not 
all) of them does not mean the refusal of the class itself.  
     
VII HISTORICAL DIALECTICS REFORMULATED BY INFORMATION AS AN 
APPROACH TO MATHEMATICAL HISTORY 
Hegel applied his doctrine of dialectics (by the way, Marxism borrowed it) to history to 
explain it by itself: by the self-motion of the World Spirit or Reason in History (the change 
of Marxism is rather cosmetic: the substitution of the World Spirit by the “matter”). The 
world and history change by themselves being forms of the totality. So, Hegelianism 
(particularly Marxism) implied and justified social and political radicalism.  
The discourse of theoretical history was introduced. A general narrative of Progress in 
history appeared. However, it was not scientific, but quasi-scientific at best. It should replace 
the usual formal logic inherent to science into “dialectical logic” able to state for any 
proposition to be true (at least, from the viewpoint of formal logic). It was not predictive, but 
descriptive and only post factum, able to explain any event or process, once it has taken place, 
“dialectically” (in virtue of dialectic logic able to prove any proposition as necessary from 
the viewpoint of the usual logic and scientific method). So the value (if any) of historical 
dialectics was rather ideological than scientific.  
Historical dialectics in its original form is inapplicable to mathematical history and even 
inconsistent to it. Fortunately, that crucial disadvantage can be neutralized by the concept of 
information for Hegel’s “triad” (as “hermeneutic circle” above) can be interpreted formally 
and logically as a bit of information under the specific condition for the definition of bit to 
be reversed: the “direction of bit” is that of any choice, and the “direction of triad” is reverse. 
Then, a bit represented by a tape cell of Turing machine can visualize the triad so: “1” notates 
Hegel’s “thesis”; “0”, “antithesis”; and the empty tape cell, Hegel’s “synthesis”.     
                                                            
10 The “totality” is meant as an initial and fundamental notion definable only contextually in the 
consistent and complete tuple of a certain axiomatic system. In advance, it can be rather suggested 
as an approximate idea, to which the tuple at issue would refer particularly.  
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One can think of the relation of “bit” and “triad” furthermore so. If one applies a bit of 
information to itself, its dual counterpart would be just the triad. The “fundamental, formal 
and logical tautology” describes and notates a bit of information consistently to formal logic. 
One admits the self-reference of a bit (i.e. to itself) just in virtue of the same tautology for 
the meta-level of the totality coincides with the level itself as far as the meta-level as external 
to the totality has to be contained in it definitively, and thus, necessarily. Furthermore, the 
tautology identifies a bit of information with the totality and consequently, a meta-bit of 
information, with a bit of information. 
Once the self-reference of a bit of information has been justified, this implies immediately 
the consistent formal and logical definition of “triad” as the dual counterpart of a bit of 
information in the framework of the “meta-bit” (admissible and justified as identical with a 
bit of information). Then the discourse of mathematical history consistent formally and 
logically will be the dual counterpart of Hegel’s dialectics of history: a discourse descriptive, 
post factum, and inconsistent to formal logic and scientific method. 
Hegel’s self-movement of history by itself, indeed, is inconsistent to formal logic as well 
as any change, including mechanical motion, by itself, i.e. considered as a whole or a form 
of the totality. It can be “repaired” to be consistent to formal logic only by a wider context, 
in which it is a part of other and more general whole. 
Fortunately, it can be introduced even to the totality itself (to which no more general 
totality to be “more total”) by means of the triad as the dual counterpart of a bit information 
and being self-referential consistently to formal logic in the virtue of the fundamental 
tautology.  
Speaking loosely and rather metaphorically, one might say that the self-movement of 
history from the human viewpoint can be transformed consistently to formal logic as the dual 
counterpart of God’s viewpoint to it, furthermore inherently consistent to both formal logic 
and mathematics and allowing for the establishment of mathematical history.       
VIII ANOTHER APPROACH TO MATHEMATICAL HISTORY: PHILOSOPHICAL 
PHENOMENOLOGY AND HERMENEUTICS IN THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
MATHEMATICAL HISTORY 
Philosophical hermeneutics and phenomenology contributes essential new approaches to 
mathematical history after reformulating dialectics by information consistently to formal 
logic and scientific method. Using the formal scheme of Hegel’s triad above, “hermeneutical 
circle” can be seen formally once again as both “meta-bit” and “bit” identical to each other 
in virtue of the definitive property of the totality, particularly containing its meta-level in 
itself, i.e. identifying “meta-level” and “level”. Then, one can think of the Hegelian triad and 
hermeneutic interpretation as equivalent due to sharing the dual counterpart of a bit of 
information: indeed, the “time of interpretation” (introduced above) is reverse to the “time 
of fact” (ibidem), and the former coincides with the “time of triad”, i.e. from “thesis” via 
“antithesis” to “synthesis”. Indeed, both are post factum meaning a fact of the past whether 
interpreting it or synthesizing it. 
The same formal equivalence of triad and interpretation allows for the triad to be realized 
as the class of all possible interpretations of the historical fact at issue meant as Hegel’s 
“thesis” in the “dialectic logic of development” inconsistent to formal logic allowing for 
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contradiction, therefore violating the law of “non-contradiction”11. If one chooses a certain 
interpretation or is supplied by an unambiguous rule to choose an element among all the class 
of triad (interpretations), the “ideological” (and quasi-scientific at best) viewpoint of 
dialectics, post factum, can be changed into the scientific one following the “time of fact” ex-
ante rather than the reverse time of interpretation. 
That crucial step for transforming Heidegger’s hermeneutics into a scientific method of 
theoretical history was realized rather by Gadamer than by Heidegger himself. It transforms 
the speculative “hermeneutic circle” (unusable by scientific method directly, analogically to 
Hegelian triad, for redundancy, though not for inconsistency, to formal logic) adding the 
empirically accessible “field of value” following the scientific time of fact and determining 
the historical actors’ interpretations however not univocally.  
Mathematical history adopts the contribution of Gadamer’s hermeneutics absolutely only 
complementing it by the natural postulate that the value field can be described 
mathematically withal exhaustively. That additional postulate needs and links “historical 
phenomenon” originating from Husserl’s phenomenology, but furthermore representable by 
a relevant mathematical structure for the objectivity of mathematical history. It involves the 
identity of “meta-bit” and “bit” in a still one way: rather as the identity of “meta-qubit” and 
“qubit”, or equivalently as that of “global space” and “local space” after identifying 
“phenomenological reduction” and “eidetic reduction” in virtue of the concept of 
“transcendental reduction”. 
Then, the identity of “meta-qubit” and “qubit”, or respectively, of “local space” and 
“global space” would be to be understood so. The choice of a certain phenomenon among all 
phenomena and the choice of an eidos among all eidoi is the same, mathematically 
isomorphic, and containing the same quantity of information being necessarily generalized, 
namely as quantum information and thus measured in qubits. 
The concept of quantum information being relied on that of infinity (more precisely, on 
the concept of infinite set or infinite series) allows for not distinguishing between the local 
level of space and the global level of space, or respectively, between “level” and “meta-
level”. It is invariant to the transition between them after the identification of them to anti-
isometry in virtue of transcendental invariance.  
As a result, the hierarchy of level and meta-level is removed and substituted by their 
duality and idempotence: in other words, the level is the meta-level to its dual level as the 
meta-level to the level, as well as vice versa. Duality and idempotency remove also the well-
ordering of level hierarchy therefore and particularly admitting a finite model of infinite 
(respectively, of infinite series or infinite sets). 
One can visualize and exemplify the above observation by type hierarchy in Russell’s 
theory of types as follows. The type hierarchy unlimited and ad infinitum in principle implies 
for the set of all types to be infinite. The same type hierarchy is reducible to two dual levels 
                                                            
11 The present approach to formalizing “dialectic logic” does not follow those of any paraconsistent 
or non-classical logics revising or generalizing implicitly or explicitly the “law of non-contradiction”. 
Both formal logic and “non-contradiction” particularly are conserved literally, but dialectic logic is 
referred to a specific logical structure called a “bit of information” and defined by the fundamental 
tautology. Then, the triad of dialectic logic is defined formally as the dual counterpart of a “bit of 
information” and in virtue of the rigorous and logical definition of the totality.   
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conventionally notable as “level” and “meta-level” mutual to each other, and thus, 
idempotent.  
The concept of transcendental reduction able to appear as “historical reduction” and 
identifying phenomenological reduction and eidetic reduction means the same kind of 
identification of level hierarchy ad infinitum to only two, but dual levels as the 
exemplification of, therefore visualizing, type theory. 
In turn, the applicability of historical reduction to mathematical history can be illustrated 
by the generalized invariance in the foundations of mathematics, after which an arithmetical 
variable able to accepts different values ad infinitum is identifiable as a logical variable 
accepting only two but dual values therefore idempotent (to each other). Indeed, the class of 
equivalence of all level hierarchies can be identified with the set of all natural numbers and 
thus implies (without being equivalent to) all the natural numbers in Peano arithmetic12. 
Then, Boolean algebra isomorphic to propositional logic is isomorphic in turn to Peano 
arithmetic (Penchev 2020 August 25) after the condition for the two-valued logical variable 
to be identifiable with the arbitrarily many-valued arithmetical variable meant in the 
mathematical model of historical reduction in particular. 
The “global” history, i.e. seen retrospectively, post factum, actually ended and as it is 
usual in the discourse of the science of history, would be to be identified in the “local” value 
field in any historical moment determining absolutely or partly (i.e. probabilistically) 
historical choices possible or done then and there. Historical reduction being an aspect of 
transcendental reduction after involving time, temporality, and historicity explicitly means 
just that identification of the temporal global history with the atemporal (as well as aspatial) 
local state of value field in any certain “point” of history.  
The same observation inspired by the establishment of mathematical history can be 
articulated otherwise as well. There exists necessarily just one counterfactual history (which 
can be eventually and particularly available as a real, but alternative history) which is 
equivalent to that atemporal and aspatial value field however well-ordered by the quantity of 
probability of any given alternative in the fan of all possible ones as to a certain historical 
choice. 
A perfectly new worldview of history is involved: the real history can be considered as 
the universal and transcendental history valid anywhere and omnipresently, whenever and 
forever once any counterfactual history (to that real one) is available necessarily as given 
locally by the state of value field of a certain historical moment. The real history to be realized 
or understood globally runs through all possible counterfactual (to it) histories however given 
locally (also aspatially and atemporally in the sense of the zero-dimensionality of a “point” 
what a historical moment is once it is thought mathematically). Thus, any counterfactual 
history, accessible neither empirically nor experimentally (as written inherently in 
“conditional mood” ostensibly “forbidden” for history), is transformed anyway in a 
phenomenon accessible at least empirically and even experimentally studying a certain state 
of value field. 
                                                            
12 All natural numbers are finite in virtue of the axiom of induction (featuring Peano arithmetic from 
set theory): indeed, “1” is finite; ‘“n” is finite’ implies that ‘“n+1” is finite’; then, the axiom of 
induction is applicable to the property of a natural number to be finite and implies for all natural 
numbers to be finite. On the contrary set theory does not include the axiom of induction, but it contains 
the “axiom of infinity”, which is not available in Peano arithmetic. 
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The sketched deduction represents furthermore the formal and logical link between 
Husserl’s phenomenology via the explicated here idea of theoretical and historical 
phenomenology to Heideger’s hermeneutics and at last, to Gadamer’s: 
Husserl’s phenomenology implies historical reduction as transcendental reduction, 
starting from the premise of the deduction, and Gadamer’s hermeneutics postulates any 
historical fact as interpreted inherently and definitively by a state of value field whether post 
factum, i.e. posteriori (the value field of the historicist(s) studying the fact at issue) or ex-
ante, i.e. a priori (the value field of the actor(s) creating history). The concept of value field 
originating from Gadamer’s hermeneutics is involved right to identified the form and the 
latter mathematically, i.e. as isomorphic to each other.  
The formal and logical link between the premises of historical phenomenology to the 
conclusion of historical hermeneutics consists in the identification of all counterfactual 
histories and all states of value field inspired by “historical reduction” (as it is introduced 
here). The same identification implies involving quantum information as embodying the 
relevant mathematical isomorphism as to mathematical history.                              
  
IX ALTERNATIVE OR COUNTERFACTUAL HISTORY TO REAL HISTORY: THE 
IDEA OF TRANSCENDENTAL AND UNIVERSAL HISTORY 
Any history written in the discourse of “conditional mood forbidden for history” is a 
counterfactual history. At least one essential historical choice has resulted in an alternative 
different from its counterpart in the real history and then, in an alternative chain of causal 
changes creating a branch of history parallel to the real course.  
One of the most famous examples is Philipp Dick’s “The Man of the High Castle” usually 
qualified as a masterpiece of the sci-fi novels therefore asking the fundamental question of 
counterfactual discourse: literature (fiction) or science (reality), and answering it 
convincingly in favor of the former; thoroughly in the framework of literary fiction and thus, 
out of science representing reality rather than fiction.  
An essential and maybe crucial counterargument offers Robert Fogel’s “Railroads and 
American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History” (1964)13 won the Nobel Prize 
in economics (1994) for “for having renewed research in economic history by applying 
economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional 
change”14. 
The implicit philosophy of history in his research (not only in this work, but also in others, 
e.g. Time on the Cross, 1974) is “collinear” and “commensurable” with the approach to 
mathematical history, which generalizes his contribution to cliometrics in a sense: 
Both cliometrics and mathematical history would be to be relied on the universal and 
transcendental history as eidetic as phenomenal both in Husserl’s meaning. Only that 
understanding of philosophy as a single one as many parallel ones is able to unify the standard 
scientific discourse of history “post factum” and the a-priori mathematical discourse “ex-
ante” therefore generalizing temporality to transcendentality. 
                                                            
13 One might admit that “The man in the High Castle” (1964), or at least its cultural and historical 
background in the USA, might influence “Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in 
Econometric History” (1964). 
14 https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1993/press-release/ (accessed on 
22.11.2020). 
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History turns out to be necessary, and the mathematical comparison of the real branch to 
a certain counterfactual branch demonstrates this statement by means of the approximate 
conservation of a quantity constructed for the research, namely "social savings". Then it, 
attributable to railroads, can be calculated and shown to be insignificant (1.3%) to the 
counterfactual case without them, and substitute technologies might compensate or even 
exceed the influence of railroads measurable by the “social savings” at issue. 
The deep philosophical idea of Fogel’s research can be seen, interpreted or generalized 
from the worldview of mathematical history so. Mathematics introduces always quantities 
able to unify different qualities. One can interpret two or many branches of history 
(particularly, one of them tcan be the real one) as two or more corresponding qualities and 
following the mathematical approach, to be unified by a relevant mathematical quantity 
(“structure” in general and more precisely). This is just the idea exemplified by “Railroads 
and American Economic Growth” so much successfully to win the Nobel Prize. 
Mathematical history can be inspired by Fogel’s triumph explicating and justifying the 
idea itself, only implicit in the “Railroads… ”.   
One can notice even the “family resemblance [Familienähnlichkeit]”15 of Fogel’s 
approach and the “fundamental, formal and logical tautology” definitively linking a “bit of 
information” and the “totality”: 
For example and following Hegel, one can speak of the “dialectics of quality and 
quantity”, and after that, see it formally and logically as a bit of information. Indeed, any two 
or more qualities are absolute different and separated from each other, but not less and 
simultaneously, they are the same quantity therefore distinguishable as different amounts of 
it, but sharing its single quality, namely to be that quantity at least, if there is no other word 
for their unity.  
Then, a bit of information (along with all other possible interpretations) is able to notate 
formally and logically the elementary transformation of quantity into quality (more exactly, 
the unity of quantity of two equally probable properties, i.e. qualities, in each of them 
disjunctively) just reversely to Hegel’s triad directed to depict the opposite transformation of 
quality (i.e. at least two different qualities) onto quantity. After that, the “totality” already 
implicitly involved by a “bit of information” in virtue of the “tautology” turns out to be 
embedded in that dialectics of quality and quantity: 
A particular corollary or exemplification of the dialectics of quality and quantity 
(formalized as above) represents Fogel’s approach to unify two histories (namely, the real 
                                                            
15 One should distinguish rigorously, formally and logically “set” from “family resemblance”: the 
former grants the unity as a new entity, namely “set”, the latter does not do this. Thus, their set is a 
shared and definitive property of all elements, regardless of any relations between them; on the 
contrary, “family resemblance” is only relations between the elements, and those relations share in 
turn only one or more family resemblances. “Family resemblance” needs an interpreter who sees it 
(therefore admitting other who does not). “Set” does not need any interpreter, or speaking 
conventionally, one might say that needs an absolute single interpreter such as “God”. The transition 
from “family resemblance” to “set” means, on the one hand, the mathematization itself of history, in 
which the multiple interpretation inherent and definitive for history, its discourse and cognition is 
overcome by the class of relevant interpretations, constructing a relevant unity and set, to which 
mathematical history makes sense; on the other hand, a single, abstract and universal, as if 
“transcendental” observer and interpreter of history appears to be necessary as to history for the 
establishment of mathematical history.       
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one with railroads and the counterfactual one without railroads) by a relevant mathematical 
quantity (or structure, in general), namely “social savings”. Mathematical history (or 
“cliometrics” by Fogel and others’ term) properly should be related to the quantity of social 
savings interpretable as an amount in the real history and as another (in general) amount in 
the specially built counterfactual history, however turning out to be almost the same as the 
former as a result of the research. 
In fact, the cognitive and research scheme of Fogel has been utilized many years ago, but 
rather unexpectedly … in Einstein’s special relativity. The family resemblance of them can 
be shown up by the mediation of Bachtin’s “chronotope”: 
The alternative history can be defined as a counterfactual history under the definitive 
condition to be real one, but somewhere else. For example, the history of China is alternative 
to that of Europe. Then and following the standard paradigm of science of history, two 
discourses of histories (of Europe or of China) appear naturally, each of them supplied by its 
own “chronotope” as any discourse. Well, special relativity generalizes that even the physical 
discourses of two regions (reference frames) and thus their “chronotopes” would be different 
under the postulate of speed light in a vacuum. However, it establishes a new quantity, 
namely “space-time interval” or “space-time distance” to be invariant after the transition 
from a reference frame to another, or respectively, between “physical chronotopes”. 
Fogel, analogically to the space-time interval of special relativity, introduced the quantity 
of social savings to unify the chronotopes of both real and counterfactual history.  
Fogel’s problem and successful solution (so successful to be noticed by the Nobel Prize 
of economics in 1993) is particular, anyway, though tracing the pathway to the most general 
problem and solution discussed here and related to the establishment of mathematical history 
withal universal.   
If Fogel decided how two certain and quite restricted histories, one of which real, and the 
other counterfactual, to be unified by a specially constructed quantity, the maximally general 
problem would refer to that mathematical structure (“structure”, in turn, as a generalization 
of “quantity” in the contemporary mathematics) able to unify any class of historical 
pathways, some of which counterfactual, others real (though alternative to each other), and 
thus the class of all possible histories, but determined unambiguously, e.g. by two events 
shared by all historical trajectories belonging to that class. 
The separable complex Hilbert space is the structure researched and advocated in this 
work. It can be seen equivalently, furthermore, as a certain quantity, quantum information 
corresponding to Fogel’s “social savings” in a sense sketched above and generalizing it as 
much as possible, i.e. to the totality.  
The history able to be identified as mathematical history is generalized to the ultimate 
extreme, to the totality. Following the metaphor already coined, history can be observed as 
mathematical only as if from “God’s viewpoint” (or physically, from “God’s reference 
frame”) as if out of the totality. However, that trope restricted by transcendentalism and 
dialectics weather philosophical or historical and scientific might mean only the totality itself 
as the invariant of transcendentalism being both immanent and transcendent on the boundary 
of them: 
Mathematical history is the history of the totality, and thus, merging to the history of the 
universe, i.e. to cosmology and physics, therefore able to share with quantum mechanics the 
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same mathematical structure, the separable complex Hilbert space, and the same quantity, 
quantum information. 
Along with the dialectics of quantity and quality involved a little above, a cyclic dialectics 
of both extremes appears: for example the extreme of the totality including all definitively 
and the opposite extreme of a bit of information, but coinciding with the former in virtue of 
the fundamental tautology withal formally and logically after it. That “cyclic dialectics” 
synthesizing the opposition of both extremes recollects Nicholas of Cusa’s doctrine or that 
of Giordano Bruno. 
As to mathematical history properly, it suggests as if what science observes by and within 
quantum mechanics as if externally to the totality would be to be the same as observed by 
and within mathematical history as if internally. They coincide only on the boundary of the 
totality, where both extremes can be identified definitively. However, what is outlined so is 
the foundations of mathematical history thus referring the absolute generality of the totality. 
Specific research in mathematical history restricts it to the particular generality of a relevant 
historical whole therefore enriching the initial mathematical structure with additional 
essential properties (axioms) or, on the contrary, simplifying it by means of classes of 
equivalence. Anyway, the former is the rule, the latter are rather exceptions.              
X THE IDEA OF FORMAL AND MATHEMATICAL HISTORY BY THE 
PARADIGM OF QUANTUM MECHANICS: THE “FEYNMAN HISTORIES” 
Once quantum mechanics and mathematical history have shared the same separable 
complex Hilbert space as foundations, any language (i.e. “interpretation”, e.g. Feynman’s) 
of the former can be both adapted and adopted by the latter.  
Feynman’s one is rather suitable and fruitful for it can be used not only by quantum 
mechanics and mathematical history (meant as human and social history only), but by the 
mathematical theory of any evolution in addition involving the mathematical model of 
evolution tree.  
The present section, however, will be restricted only to the applicability of Feynman’s 
viewpoint to mathematical history.  
The base is the identification of historical pathway with Feynman’s trajectory, due to 
mathematical isomorphism. If one considers an infinite set of those trajectories between two 
certain points of any kind of vector space including the usual three-dimensional space of 
experience, in which human history takes place, with a corresponding probability density 
distribution defined on the continuum of all of them, the characteristic function of that 
distribution is a wave function, i.e. an element of the separable complex Hilbert space. It 
describes all the infinite class of possible trajectories as a single complex trajectory by two 
independent variables: a universal time during each of them and relative (density) probability 
to happen, being a parameter of each of them and thus, a variable definable on the all set of 
them.  
One might say (but only quite conventionally and following Feynman’s visualization) 
that time is a variable, and probability is a “metavariable”. However, the converse statement 
exchanging which is the variable and which is the metavariable, i.e. the level and meta-level 
in an idempotent way, is not less correct: after exchanging in parallel both dual spaces, one 
would fetch the initial wave function.  
The original Feynman visualization is impossible already in the latter case, but another 
not less interesting visualization is relevant: that of the “many worlds” language and 
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interpretation suggested by Hugh Everett III. The possible Feynman trajectories are 
exchanged by the real, but alternative Everett worlds.  
However, what about “probability” transformed from a “metavariable” to a “variable”? 
Well, probability, though it is often interpreted as the quantity of possibility, is not more 
than any normed quantity seen only and properly mathematically, i.e. such as velocity in 
special relativity, where it can be normed always by the fundamental constant of light speed 
in a vacuum and less than a unit just as the standard probability whether “objective” or 
“subjective”. So, the metavariable of relative probability turns out to be relative velocity 
involved by special relativity, and what is a trajectory in the Feynman interpretation is again 
a trajectory in the Everett interpretation though the variable and metavariable are exchanged 
mutually.  
Anyway, but only at first glance, the difference is conserved as to the sense of the 
metavariables in each case: the Feynman trajectories are only possible unlike the Everett 
worlds, which are only real. 
One can equate an Everett world to a reference frame in general relativity (since the 
relative probability, resp. relative velocity is variable) therefore implying a force field, in 
which the “probabilistic field” turns out to be transformed. The parallel worlds ostensibly 
non-interacting can be consistently unified as a class of reference frames sharing the same 
space and thus interacting in virtue of the force field at issue. 
 Looking deeper, the alleged difference between Feynman’s and Everett’s approach 
vanishes absolutely for the quantity of probability density in the former can be analogically 
interpreted as the quantity of subluminal velocity (to the light speed constant). So, both 
approaches admit equally well an equivalent representation where both variable and 
metavariable can be real and actual separately, but mutually complimentary as well as the 
case of the one actual, and the other be possible (probabilistic). 
If both variable and metavariable are real and actual, the Feynman and Everett 
interpretation are idempotent to each other in a Hamiltonian meaning: the variable and 
metavariable are the two Hamiltonian conjugates (e.g. momenta and space coordinates) 
whoever exchanged to the opposition of level and meta-level in each of them (e.g. momenta 
are variables in Everett’s, but metavariables in Feynman’s, and vice versa as to coordinates).   
If the one is real and actual (never mind which), and the other is probabilistic (again never 
mind which), this involves Max Born’s interpretation of quantum mechanics, and thus, of the 
separable complex Hilbert space16 (after which wave function is interpreted as the 
characteristic function of the probability density distribution of the variable or that of the 
idempotent metavariable in the dual space).  
Thus, the Feynman interpretation (as far as it is directly interpretable in terms of 
mathematical history after the substitution of “trajectory” with “historical pathway” or 
                                                            
16 The qubit Hilbert space involved by the theory of quantum information unifies all the three 
interpretation:  
a property inherited from the separable complex Hilbert space in virtue of the isomorphism to it under 
an additional, but natural condition. Thus, the quantity of quantum information measured by the units 
of qubit represents the phenomenological “epoché” to reality, but now, in terms of quantum 
mechanics and information, which is an obligatory condition for the foundations of mathematical 
history in order to be able to borrow the mathematical formalism of the separable complex (or qubit) 
Hilbert space.  
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“history”) is able to promote also the applicability of the Everett and Born approaches as well 
as the concept of quantum information for realizing the establishment of mathematical 
history.  
First of all, one need make clear how to relate variable and metavariable in mathematical 
history and to think of them to be idempotent: 
The natural variable is time or historical time: it is shared by the real, counterfactual or 
alternative history. Unlike the special relativity, it can be granted as universal, and thus the 
same in each of them. However, the corresponding metavariable seems not to be any quantity, 
but a specific quality different in each historical pathway. For example that quality can be 
designated by the name of the region for an alternative history to take place (e.g. the history 
of China) or by the initial and bifurcating one or more facts dividing a counterfactual history 
from the real one. One would acquire a set of names (furthermore interpretable as properties 
and thus qualities, each of which attributable unambiguously to each pathway): quite 
insufficient for any quantity of metavariable to be introduced. One needs an additional and 
intermediate mapping from the set of natural names of histories into a relevant set consisting 
only of mathematical entities such as numbers, vectors, probabilities, etc. 
However, the naturalness of that auxiliary mapping seems to be quite and even 
fundamentally problematic as far as it originates from a definitively non-empirical entity 
what the totality is. In other words, the naturalness should be interpreted in a way not being 
empirical in definition, but referring to history, an empirical science, only by the mediation 
of the totality postulated for the establishment of mathematical history to be possible.  
Indeed, the totality is able to choose unambiguously a relevant metavariable to the 
variable of historical time, respectively a mapping of the set of names of histories into 
mathematical entities. Even more, it can justify an empirical counterpart of it, thus accessible 
experimentally.  
The mediator is the conception of transcendentalism (here interpreted rigorously and in a 
falsifiable way: historical and mathematical transcendentalism).  
Mathematical transcendentalism (Penchev 2020 August 25) delivers the equivalence of 
the well-ordering “theorem” and the axiom of choice (almost trivially provable in set theory) 
as a conclusion of the postulate of the totality as well: therefore allowing for mathematization 
of humanitarian sciences such as history consistent to the totality (as Hegel’s philosophy of 
history demonstrated first by his “dialectics”).  
Then, historical time corresponding to the well-ordering “theorem” implies a hypothetical 
counterpart after the equivalent axiom of choice, which is interpretable as information and 
can be specified as quantum information (i.e. the information of infinite set) as far as that 
counterpart as a quantity is measurable by the units of elementary choices such as bits or 
qubits. 
The counterpart of historical time can be explicated so: it represents the quantity of 
elementary choices necessary for the set consisting of “names of histories” to be ordered well 
to be equivalent to the corresponding historical time being well-ordered in definition. Then, 
once that quantity is measured by the units of elementary choices, it is necessary to be 
information or isomorphic to information. 
Information in general (particularly quantum information) is the metavariable conjugate 
to the variable of historical time after the above abstract cogitation. However, what would be 
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to be its historical sense is unclear yet. The usual scientific discourse of history does not 
involve it explicitly, so that it should be a specific contribution of mathematical history: 
If one considers any historical process not as current, but post factum just as historical 
cognition describes it as happened in the past, an exactly determined quantity of information 
necessary to be that process ordered in time, in the way it has taken place really, corresponds 
to the variable of historical time, obviously being a natural metavariable needing to comprise 
and comprehend all the process as a whole. Then, this is the historical sense of information 
as the searched metavariable: the information containing in the narrative able to represent the 
process at issue relevantly.  
One sees immediately why the usual scientific discourse of history is fundamentally 
incapable to introduce it: it is metavariable just to it, thus needing it to be complete, so being 
not introducible in it currently, in its course, implying for it to be self-predicative. On the 
contrary, mathematical history is able to define it rigorously just in virtue of involving the 
totality in advance as a postulate therefore predetermining the consistent resolution of the 
problem of self-predicativity to the totality definitively. 
Still one feature is to be noticed in relation to information as an explicit metavariable of 
mathematical history: it reflects that any historical fact is interpreted inherently to exist; in 
other words, historical facts which are not interpreted do not exist, they make sense only in 
a certain historical discourse or narrative. Of course, different historians would create 
different discourses and narratives as if sharing the same facts though interpreted differently 
in general. From the viewpoint of mathematical history, they would be equivalent to 
alternative or counterfactual histories17. 
Following the intention of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, one can suggest for any historical 
discourse or narrative, being definitively post factum, to correspond to real historical actors’ 
counterpart, by which they are able to choose one or other action or decision. However, that 
counterpart does not share the converse time of interpretation, but the “normal” arrow of 
historical time. 
Formally in mathematical history, the exchange of variable and metavariable is embedded 
in the counterpart, more precisely described so: the variable is the previous metavariable, the 
discourse or narrative information available for historical actors as value “field” partly 
predetermining their actions and decisions. However then, historical time turns out to be the 
metavariable able to “continue” further or to the next moment of historical time only after a 
certain decision or action has been accomplished (just corresponding to being a metavariable 
properly).    
The interpretation of mathematical history in terms of quantum information would mean 
just the understanding of the qubit Hilbert space as the information weather of the discourse, 
narrative or of the relevant value field conditioning historical choices or actions and being 
complimentary to each other as opposite temporally: the former time arrow is “backward”, 
post factum, that of interpretation of the historical process as complete; and unlike the latter 
of historical time being “forward”, ex-ante.   
The local space of historical time seen as global space comprises all states of value field 
in any moment. Quantum information allows for that value field to be represented 
                                                            
17 One can distinguish the alternative narratives from counterfactual narratives to the real history in 
the meant sense so: alternative narratives are facts in the real history, they have taken place; the 
counterfactual narratives, on the contrary, are not facts in the real history, they have not happened.   
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mathematically regardless of its interpretation in a certain history. The dual viewpoint by 
means of interpretational time, “backward”, exchanges variable and metavariable, local and 
global space: now the discourse (narrative) is situated in the global space containing as local 
spaces all possible interpretations in all alternative or counterfactual discourses (narratives). 
The concept of transcendental or universal history inferable from mathematical history 
would suggest just the above dual viewpoints to be idempotent: if not, an implicit global 
value field would act therefore conditioning for “action” (or “action time”, i.e. historical 
time) and interpretation (or “interpretational time”) not be equivalent to each other differing 
only by the direction of time arrow. Furthermore, that implicit global value field can be 
identified as a certain local value field in a exactly determined moment of historical time, in 
which meta-discourse of transcendental or universal history (as in the present paper) would 
be involved; and vice versa: the postulate of ideological neutrality would imply for the two 
dual mathematical histories to be idempotent (i.e. as if from “God’s worldview”).  
“Born’s interpretation” of mathematical history (i.e. that analogical to Born’s 
interpretation of quantum mechanics) would equate both descriptions of history either by 
actual historical time and virtual discourse (narrative) or by virtual (i.e. counterfactual) 
historical time, but actual discourse, on the one hand, with its description as transcendental 
or universal history as above involving quantum information and the qubit Hilbert space. 
Speaking loosely, the following example would be relevant for the sense of Born’s 
interpretation of mathematical history:  
The narrative of The Man of the High Castle describes a counterfactual history certainly. 
However, if it could be formalized mathematically, i.e. to a certain wave function 
representing exhaustively all information containing in the novel, it is the same wave function 
as that of a real history to any eventual description of it. In other words, in the pole of 
mathematical history seems that Philipp Dick’s fiction has described a real history: by the 
way, a suggestion implicitly claimed by the author by means of the novel.      
The many-worlds interpretation would involve the global history as follows. All possible 
counterfactual histories would be granted as alternative, i.e. really happened, but in 
alternative universes, at least, and at best, as alternative history somewhere around the world. 
That latter case might postulate conventionally zero probability of all alternative histories 
“taken place” out of the earth (i.e. in the cosmos). So, the global human history (only within 
the earth) would be the transcendental and universal history for any other history has turned 
out to be impossible, with zero probability to occur. However, an objection would be that 
many alternative histories taken place on remote planets orbiting around other stars different 
than the sun are unknown, but real.     
        
XI BOTH “FEYNMAN HISTORY” AND QUANTUM MECHANICS SHARING THE 
COMMON UNDERLYING STRUCTURE OF THE SEPARABLE COMPLEX HILBERT 
SPACE 
The Feynman approach to mathematical history reveals the isomorphism with quantum 
mechanics therefore challenging common sense in many relations. The most of them are 
well-known from quantum mechanics, and now, only transferred into mathematical history 
via the formalism of Hilbert space. 
However, there exists still one referring to the relation of mathematical history and 
quantum mechanics, and not explicated in the usual ways for the latter to be interpreted. 
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Quantum mechanics means microscopic physical entities such as elementary particles, 
atoms, etc., and history (and particularly mathematical history), macroscopic bodies such as 
humans, weapons, ships, planes, military technics, etc. obeying classical mechanics (the 
properties, relations and laws of which are quite different from those of quantum mechanics). 
The trouble can be represented relevantly by the quantity of energy, the conservation of 
which is a fundamental physical law valid in both, on the one hand, and quite different in 
magnitude in the microscopic world of quantum mechanics in comparison with the 
macroscopic history, on the other hand. The quantity of energy and its conservation implies 
for the “big” and “small” to be quite different withal in an absolute sense. 
On the contrary, the shared mathematical formalism suggests for them to be equivalent 
even physically. This is a contradiction, fortunately, resolvable easily, but to detriment of 
common sense: the absolute difference of the “big” and “small” is to be suspended, and 
proclaimed to be relative (even generalizing Einstein’s relativity to a new kind of “external” 
or “discrete” reference frames) therefore restricting energy conservation to make sense and 
thus be applicable and valid only to “temporal physics” and heralding the non-temporal 
physics of quantum information: the phenomena of which are out of space and time by 
themselves, and only “projectable” on the “screen” of space-time. The conserved quantity in 
that generalized case is quantum information, not energy. A new, generalizing law of 
quantum information conservation comprises both old, temporal and new, non-temporal 
physics. 
Mathematical history is to be related to the latter: a statement seeming to be paradoxical 
for history is temporal definitively, and mathematical history in particular would be to be 
temporal as well. In fact, this is only reason for the mathematical history not to be established 
until now since this which is possible, on the contrary and speaking figuratively, only from 
the “eternal (i.e. non-temporal) viewpoint of God”.  
Anyway, the non-temporal viewpoint to history is necessary only as a “Wittgenstein 
ladder” to be established mathematical history, i.e. in its foundations. One need define and 
then identify the local and global space of history interpreted always and definitively. Fact 
ant interpretation are divided disjunctively, but in a dual and idempotent way between the 
two spaces. The “eternal viewpoint to history” introduces the pair of fact and interpretation 
as necessary for mathematical history; however being dual to each other, only one of them is 
available actually therefore keeping the temporality of history in each case whichever it be. 
So, the eternality of history is available explicitly only in the foundations, but implicit in 
mathematical history as established and articulated.  
The worldview after mathematical history is really challenging to common sense: 
speaking loosely or figuratively, what one sees in quantum experiments is … our history and 
we ourselves or at least entities isomorphic to our history and we ourselves. The huge part of 
information is lost in mathematical history to be able to be identifiable with quantum 
mechanics after sharing the qubit Hilbert space.  
However, that information lose is conditioned still by the course of time, or more 
precisely, by the principle of maximal or increasing entropy. What can be conserved is only 
quantum information or the classical information of infinite series or sets, and thus, equitable 
to the former. All classical information referring to finite series or sets is being lost in the 
course of time therefore determining decreasing information or respectively increasing 
entropy. 
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However, information seems to increase (respectively for entropy to decrease0 in human 
history due to the ordering activity of humankind. This is a possible objection to 
mathematical history (at least, to the way to be established here) and thus it needs a relevant 
explanation. In other words, the contradiction appears after linking physics (particularly 
quantum mechanics) where entropy increases to history being human activity where 
information increases, and entropy decreases. What is the source of inflow information in 
history, furthermore defined in a way not to contradict to physics?18 
The short answer is: it is due to the historical choices according to value field and 
corresponding to any interpretation, necessarily accompanying any fact in a narrow sense in 
order to be transformed into a historical fact properly, i.e. interpreted, recorded, and 
registered in a relevant discourse (narrative). This means that mathematical history is to 
distinguish the vanishing classical information from the conserved quantum information by 
the criterion for information to be interpreted, i.e. only „written down on paper”, by which 
an implicit interpretation is chosen already.  
Quantum information in physics can be considered furthermore as that classical 
information (thus taking place in a certain space-time spot or “point”) which is “written down 
on paper in the Book of Nature” (thus omnipresent instantly, but interpretable anywhere by 
means of four additional “letters” of classical information propagating only subluminally)19. 
All unrecorded classical information vanishes in time, all recorded classical information is 
quantum information being conserved. Thus, information can only decrease in time (and 
respectively, entropy increases therefore justifying the “second law of thermodynamics”). 
The viewpoint of mathematical history sharing the same formalism complements a new 
understanding of “written down history” to physics, in fact, available already in it by itself20.    
The same solution of the problem as to mathematical history can be divided in successive 
stages and discussed in more detail:  
1. Quantum information is only the recorded classical information. This means that the 
record (and thus implicit interpretation) adds a complimentary doubling of a certain part of 
what takes place, i.e. to the fact to be transformed into a historical fact. The other part of 
information, which is not registered, vanishes in the “sands of time” increasing entropy by 
itself21.  
                                                            
18 The analogical inflow of quantum information justifies dark matter and dark energy as this is 
demonstrated in: Penchev 2020 October 20.  
19 This statement is proved in the theory of quantum information and known as the law of 
teleportation. 
20  The so-called Hawking paradox claiming that any black hole cancels quantum information 
(therefore violating that law of conserving it) is a very famous example that the idea and problem 
about the recording of information has appeared in physics before that of mathematical history as 
here.  
21 The corresponding understanding of the “record in the Book of Nature” is very instructive. 
Measurement in quantum mechanics is the record in question. It cancels necessarily just the half of 
information of the measured quantum coherent state therefore transforming quantum information into 
finite classical information (what any result of measurement represents) by neglecting the second, 
dual part of finite information. That measurement as a record can be equivalently transformed into an 
explicit decision of the experimenter which half of variables be measured (recorded) and which not. 
Though the measurement occurs here and now, i.e. in a certain space-time point, it can be considered 
as omnipresent after complementing with “four letters” (respectively, with two bits or a single 
“complex bit”: “complex bit” is different from “quantum bit, qubit”) able to restore the information 
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The doubling is dual in virtue of the time arrow of interpretation (record), post factum, 
and thus conversed to that of factual time. Each time arrow (either that of fact or that of 
interpretation) is disjunctive to other. The two “times” cannot be given simultaneously 
temporally, i.e. “at the same time” literally. If both are available (as in quantum information), 
this implies for well-ordering to be cancelled as well as any projection on the temporal 
“screen”.   
 That understanding of quantum information as the recorded classical information is 
mediated by two logical equivalences: (1) quantum information is equivalent to the classical 
information of infinite series or sets (Penchev 2020 July 10); (2) the classical information of 
infinite series or sets is equivalent to the classical information of two disjunctive (“gapped”) 
finite series or sets (Penchev 2020 August 25). If both premises are valid, here is 
complemented only the interpretation of the two “gapped” pieces of classical information as 
referring either to fact either to interpretation (record). 
2. The interpretation (record) of fact is transformed into (particularly, identified as)  
the corresponding historical decision predetermining (at least, partly) the fact at issue, and 
the time arrow of which is collinear with that of the fact. However, the decision being ideal 
and the fact being material can be considered as “gapped” not less than the opposition of fact 
and interpretation. In turn, the decision unlike the record being material just as the fact does 
not conserved: it represents that classical information vanishing in the course of time and 
conditioning increasing entropy. 
So, that transformation (or identification) of record into decision generates a complex 
invariance consisting of two elementary oppositions neutralizing each other applied jointly: 
(1) the conversing time arrows; (2) material (conserving) versus ideal (vanishing). The same 
invariance can be understood or realized so as well: the time of interpretation converted into 
the time of decision implies for the latter to be only virtual (ideal) rather than real as that of 
the fact.        
           
XII HILBERT ARITHMETIC TO MATHEMATICAL HISTORY: NEOPYTHA-
GOREANISM 
The “Feynman history” explores the isomorphism of quantum mechanics and 
mathematical history. A previous paper (Penchev 2020 August 25) discusses the unity of the 
foundations of both quantum mechanics and mathematics also sharing the separable complex 
(qubit) Hilbert space. Then and as a conclusion, mathematical history possesses the same 
foundations as mathematics: thus, a form of neo-Pythagoreanism heralding that ontology, or 
“first philosophy” is mathematical, even arithmetical though in a new, generalized meaning, 
as Hilbert arithmetic.  
Concisely, “Hilbert arithmetic” is defined (in the same paper) by a few properties or 
relations: 
                                                            
lost after measuring anywhere in the universe by doubling the available finite classical information 
of the measurement. However, those “four letters” as well as the classical information of the 
measurement itself separately can be transmitted only subluminally. Then, one can grant that quantum 
information is transmitted instantly everywhere, by the record of the measurement occurring here and 
now, but nonetheless omnipresent, being verifiable everywhere. Of course, measurement in a narrow 
sense is only a human activity, however it can be generalized by the concept of decoherence not 
needing humans to take place, and thus, “writing down in the Book of Nature” not worse than us.     
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1. It consists of three Peano arithmetics: two twin, and idempotent complementary copies 
of Peano arithmetic22 in its standard interpretation as well-orderings; the third one is a non-
standard interpretation23 of it possessing the structure of Boolean algebra and thus as 
isomorphic to propositional logic as consistent to set theory (unlike the standard 
interpretation after the Gödel incompleteness theorems in 1931), and even isomorphic to it 
after a few natural conventions.  
2. Each of both interpretations seen from the other one represents transfinite ordinal 
numbers well ordered by the function successor as it is defined in the other twin and 
alternatively to the own definition. Then, those transfinite ordinal numbers can define 
equivalent “transfinite natural numbers” unambiguously. In other words, the twin Peano 
arithmetic contents all transfinite natural numbers of Peano arithmetic, but ordered well 
“backward”, reversely to each other in both twins. Then Hilbert arithmetic can be seen in two 
equivalent, but complimentary ways: (1) as consisting of two dual Peano arithmetics; and 
(2), as consisting of two dual transfinite Peano arithmetics. 
3. One can construct bijection of the separable complex Hilbert space and the dual one, 
on the one hand, and the two dual transfinite Peano arithmetics, on the other hand, after 
involving the Dedekind, set-theoretical finiteness. This means that any transfinite natural 
number can be identified as just one wave function (and vice versa as well), i.e. any quantum 
state being properly physical can be interpreted as a transfinite natural number being properly 
mathematical mapped into each other unambiguously. Mathematics and quantum mechanics 
(thus physics) are merged by the concept of Hilbert arithmetic equivalent to the separable 
complex (or qubit) Hilbert space. 
4. Hilbert arithmetic can be interpreted immediately and equivalently in terms of 
information including quantum information. Indeed, any namesake (better, “number-sake”) 
natural numbers, whether finite or transfinite, of the three Peano arithmetics constituting 
Hilbert arithmetic can represent a bit of information. Any transfinite natural number can 
represent a qubit of quantum information (under a formal convention) as well as the set of 
all bits of three number-sake elements.  
The concept of information, respectively quantum information allows for mathematics 
and quantum mechanics (thus physics) to merge their foundations: a common informational 
base is divided in two branches: mathematics and quantum mechanics (physics). The latter 
adds only the postulate of the equivalence of the quantities of information and physical action 
by the fundamental Planck constant.   
                                                            
22 They differ from each other in the interpretations of two Peano axioms. The function of successor 
is defined as usual in the one: 𝑢𝑢 + 1, but as 𝑢𝑢 − 1 in the other one. Then, the unit of the former is the 
standard “1”, but that of the latter is “𝜔𝜔” defined as the least countable ordinal. This implies that the 
complementary Peano arithmetic needs its twin for the unit “1” is involved in the latter; otherwise, as 
“𝜔𝜔” as “1” should be postulated in the former therefore necessarily involving an additional axiom not 
available in the original Peano axioms. 
23 The nonstandard interpretation (1) interprets the function successor as “𝑢𝑢 = ”,  i.e. 2 means “1=1”, 
3 means “1=1=1”, etc., and (2) unifies both complimentary standard interpretations therefore being 
extended from “1” to “𝜔𝜔”, which furthermore can be linked cyclically to each other due to “1= 𝜔𝜔” 
(i.e. an abbreviated notation of  "1 = 2 = 3 =  …  =  𝜔𝜔 − 1 =  𝜔𝜔"). Then, the nonstandard 
arithmetical addition turns out to be Boolean disjunction, and multiplication, Boolean conjunction.  
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Meaning that concise representation of Hilbert arithmetic, one can notice that its 
interpretation by information (as in 4) can be interpreted directly in terms of the “Feynman 
history”, and thus, in those of mathematical history for both Feynman history and Feynman 
interpretation of quantum mechanics share the separable complex Hilbert space as their 
common mathematical formalism, in turn equivalent to the qubit Hilbert space of Hilbert 
arithmetic. 
Then, a rigorous, formal and logical link even in the form of deduction can be tracked 
from Hilbert arithmetic as a neo-Pythagorean kind of ontology (as fundamental as specific 
and historic) to mathematical history.  
The main conclusion is that mathematical history suggests or even implies a 
contemporary doctrine of Pythagoreanism.    
  
XIII THE TOTALITY OF BOTH HISTORY AND MATHEMATICS AND  
THE PRINCIPLE OF LEAST ACTION IN PHYSICS 
One can generalize historical and mathematical transcendentalism originating from the 
totality similarly to physical and mathematical transcendentalism withal sharing the same 
mathematical formalism also originating from the postulate of the totality. 
Then, the shared concept of the totality and mathematical formalism are sufficient to 
promote a law of mathematical history similar to that of least action in physics though invalid 
in quantum mechanics: the law of least choice. It means that the real historical pathways is 
chosen in the fan of variations under the criterion of least historical choices, or that supplying 
most historical continuity (respectively, least social and political revolutions). It will be 
deduced in detail from the law of quantum information conservation in the next section. 
Here and again extremely concisely, the “first deduction” in a previous paper (Penchev 
2020 October 20) will be represented for it is a premise of that in the next section (which can 
be considered also as an interpretation of the “second deduction” in the cited paper in relation 
to mathematical history). 
The concept of the totality by means of scientific transcendentalism whether physical and 
mathematical as in the previous article or historical and mathematical as it is interpreted here 
consistently to the context implies the conservation of quantum information after the 
following few logical steps: 
1. The totality (by mathematical transcendentalism) implies the consistent completeness 
of mathematics which can be proved once the foundations of mathematics has been identified 
as Hilbert arithmetic. This needs the relevant kind of Pythagoreanism, which includes the 
world (particularly, the world meant by history as its subject) in the scope of mathematics 
even in a narrow sense. The link at issue was tracked in the previous section. 
2. Then, Hilbert arithmetic implies the conservation of quantum information. Any 
arithmetic including Hilbert one is both atemporal and aspatial, and valid anywhere in the 
universe in definition. The same statement can be interpreted otherwise as well: the 
arithmetical unit is conserved universally. However, Hilbert arithmetic considers it as a bit 
of information or complimentarily, as a qubit of quantum information. If arithmetical unit is 
the same anywhere in the universe, this sameness is valid necessarily for qubit in virtue of 
the postulate of the totality of mathematical and physical transcendentalism. 
That universal sameness of qubit means the conservation of quantum information for the 
representability of quantum information at all (i.e. any wave function) as a single qubit in 
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virtue of the equivalence of both quantum information and single qubit to the information of 
infinite series or sets (Penchev 2020 July 10).  
3. The branch of physics originating from the fundamental and shared foundation of 
information and quantum information is stood out by postulating the quantity of physical 
action as the dual counterpart of the physical quantum information is identified with the 
mathematical quantum information of Hilbert arithmetic as the omnipresent quantum 
information originating from the totality directly.  
One should emphasize that the concept of action if it originates from the physical quantum 
information is not committed to the space-time framework of physics as it is common in it 
until now thoroughly. In other words, “action” equivalent to information suggests the 
existence of a new kind of atemporal and aspatial physics and thus obeying the conservation 
of quantum information rather than that of energy for it is out of the “temporal screen” 
obligatory for the contemporary physics including the Standard model24.        
However, that statement (3) is to be modified for the objectivity of mathematical history 
by the substitution of “physical action” with “historical action” though the latter is only 
another interpretation of the mathematical structure (or quantity) underlying both of them. 
The concept of historical action means as that of physical action the option of the 
atemporal and aaspatial historical actions. Historical action can be divided in two 
components, or two kinds of historical choice: (1) empirical, accomplished by historical 
actors in the course of historical event in their chronotop (their “here and now”) and 
depending on their free will; and (2), the welded value field independent of their free will 
and partly predetermining the possible choices of the actors possessing free will. The latter 
does not accomplish by them, but rather obeys them, obliges them in advance: they ought to 
do one or another ethically and imperatively.  
Though the physical action out of space-time seems to be rather paradoxical to physics 
committed to the empirical framework, the concept of historical action out of space-time is 
quite natural for the choice depends on mental (thus, atemporal and aspatial) conditions in 
default.  
Then, one traces a direct, formal and logical pathway from the law of least action in 
physics via the conservation of quantum information to a conjectured law of least action in 
history for example so as it follows in the next section.       
XIV THE CONSERVATION OF QUANTUM INFORMATION APPLIED TO 
MATHEMATICAL HISTORY: THE LAW OF LEAST CHOICE 
If one applies the way in which the law of least action can be considered as generalized 
to the conservation of quantum information, but in the reverse direction and as to 
mathematical history, the hypothesis of least choice can be formulated so. The first stage (1) 
is to be the detailed investigation of the way how the former is related to the latter my means 
of energy conservation being a corollary of following the “trajectory of least action”, and 
simultaneously, a conclusion from the conservation of quantum information therefore 
determining the relation between them. Thus, the first stage can be subdivided into two ones 
in turn: 
                                                            
24 The “second deduction” in the cited paper (Penchev 2020 October 20) infers dark matter and dark 
energy from the conservation of quantum information just as the projections of the “dark” reality 
behind the “screen” of space-time on it.  
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1.1. How the law of least action implies energy conservation (in classical mechanics): 
Once the framework (or “screen”) of space-time has been involved as necessary for the 
law of least choice to make sense, the first derivative of action to time, i.e. energy is constant 
during all the trajectory defined by the condition to be least along it. The so-called first 
Noether (1918) theorem of conservation once interprets that conclusion to the Lie group of 
time translations and the conjugate (to action) conservation of energy, and then, twice, 
generalized it to any pair of physical quantities conjugate to each other in relation of action. 
So, an implicit premise in the law of least action is that just one single trajectory has been 
determined as the real one, and that single trajectory is furthermore defined by the least 
integral of action along it. 
1.2. How quantum information conservation implies energy conservation (in quantum 
mechanics): 
Energy conservation in quantum mechanics is a corollary from the property to be unitary 
being postulated in it due to the mathematical formalism of the separable complex Hilbert 
space: 
Its vector interpretation embedded in Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics and its function 
interpretation in Schrödinger’s wave mechanics are equivalent only under the condition of 
unitarity therefore being a necessary for the former and latter to be unified in the 
contemporary quantum mechanics.  
As to the projection of physical phenomena on the “temporal screen” (not being necessary 
in general, for example, for those of quantum information such as entanglement), it can be 
generalized to physics at all (as far as it is valid in its base, quantum mechanics), and further, 
interpreted philosophically, as the “transcendental invariance” of the temporal projection 
with the correlative atemporal physical phenomenon in turn complemented by a unique 
mathematical structure properly. 
Quantum information conservation regulates the unambiguous way in which the 
apparatus and the measured quantum entity can correlate to each other to keep the wave 
function as the same (i.e. the wave function of the quantum entity by itself and the wave 
function reproduced by a series of measurements of the apparatus). Both extremes of that 
correlation can be considered as the two dual energy conservations in quantum mechanics 
(unlike the single one in classical mechanics due to the “transparency” of the apparatus in it). 
They are: (1) the invariance of energy of any quantum entity regardless of which apparatus 
has measured its energy (2) the invariance of energy of all the class of unitarily transformed 
quantum states as to a certain apparatus25, due to which the class in question can be 
considered as a single physical entity.  
Thus, the deduction of energy conservation from that of quantum information means 
extremes just as the principle of least action, but the ontological status of the corresponding 
variations is different: relative (i.e. in relation to the correlative variation) in the former, but 
absolute in the latter (for the correlative interpretation is zero as far as the apparatus is 
“transparent” identically and definitively). 
Once the kind of generalization in (1), i.e. from both (1.1) law of least action and (1.2) 
quantum energy conservation to energy conservation, has be made clear, then the quantum 
                                                            
25 The unitary transformation of quantum state make sense in general only to a certain apparatus. 
Anyway the concept of unitary transformation can be generalized granting a certain non-unitary 
transformation as unitary conventionally.   
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information conservation can be transferred and thus established in mathematical history in 
virtue of the shared and underlying structure of the qubit Hilbert space: at last another 
quantity or structure isomorphic to the law of least action in physics can be indicated in 
mathematical history and after that interpreted in history (in the next section).  
That analogue of the law of least action in physics as to history and mathematical history 
is called the law of least choice. Speaking figuratively (and following the metaphor coined 
by the authors of the free will theorems in quantum mechanics in Conway, Kochen, 2006; 
2009@), the “commodity of free will” in both physics and history is so valuable that it has 
to be saved or spared as much as possible, respectively spent minimally. That “thrift” is just 
the condition for the pathway of real history to be that of least choice as needing least free 
will. The rigorous, withal formal and mathematical meaning of that metaphor, i.e. (2) the 
reverse deduction from quantum information conservation in mathematical history to the law 
of least choice in history, can be subdivided also in two stages therefore involving the idea 
of still one analogue (that of energy conservation), which can be called conventionally and 
provisionally the “conservation of historical continuity”, in turn a corollary from the 
conjectured law of least choice. Both are: 
2.1. How quantum information conservation in mathematical history implies that 
conservation of historical continuity 
In fact, the conservation of historical continuity means the dual analogue to that of energy 
conservation in physics: the smooth, steady, uniform, and collinear course of time only in 
one direction (“time arrow”) meant in the “Lie group of translations in time” of Noether’s 
first theorem (1918). So, the dual twin in history, unambiguously implied by the conservation 
of historical continuity, would be to be called the “conservation of reality” meaning that the 
historical pathway share the same reality along and during it, in all moments of time.  
Of course, if reality is a single one in definition, the above condition is satisfied trivially. 
However, that is not the case in quantum mechanics shared in quantum information as well. 
Many parallel worlds in both have become obvious after Everett’s interpretation, and the 
conservation of reality does make sense as a restriction as heuristic as obligate: any mix of 
parallel realities is not admissible.  
The shared mathematical formalism transfers the same conservation of reality onto 
mathematical history as that along and during any possible history whether real or alternative, 
or counterfactual therefore implying for it to conserve the own single continuity.  
The condition of many realities or many histories being meaningful doubles the variations 
and thus their extremes. The classical “least action” means one single variation of trajectories, 
but not the correlative variations of the apparatuses for it is zero in definition after all possible 
apparatus are “transparent” identically. Quantum mechanics elucidates that the latter 
variation is not less meaningful that the former.  
Quantum information borrows that doubling and transforms into mathematical, indeed 
seeing it as the following two interpretations also dual to each other:  (1) the variation of the 
states of value field to a single history granted to be the real one (as in the classical case); and 
(2), the variation of histories to a single state of value. At last, (3) one can demonstrate that 
any combination of both (what the concept of entanglement in the proper theory of quantum 
information means) can be reduced equivalently and relevantly in historical terms either to 
(1) or to (2). 
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As far as (1) is just the classical case of the standard historiography (though eventually 
mathematized), quantum information conservation in mathematical history as the 
conservation of historical continuity can be not less equivalently and relevantly reduced to:           
2.2. How the law of least choice implies the conservation of historical continuity 
Any choice means a leap for the next state of history being discretely separated from the 
present one and can be achieved in many future real pathways, each of which possible and 
probable in accordance with the value field in the moment of historical choice at issue. It 
predetermines the choice but only partly needing the free will of the actors to be 
accomplished ultimately.  
Backwardly and post factum realizing it, one can notice that it has conserved historical 
continuity whatever have been. The human free will is necessary crucially to link the “broken 
history”, “cut time” therefore proving itself as a necessary condition for history even to exist.  
Nonetheless, ex-ante, the bridge of historical continuity is neither obvious nor the 
continuation of history is guaranteed: the choice can turn out to be so wrong to cease the 
history of all the class of actors making the choice, immediately or in the close future. Not 
less vice versa: any historical extinction of a group of actors or its subjugation, infusion and 
melting into another is preceded by a series of wrong choices therefore not being able to 
overcome the gap of history (what any historical event is in fact), but ceasing and finishing 
the own history.  
The human community questioned by history which the correct choice is answers 
according its value field summarizing the total available experience of that group. Historical 
memory has conserved the kind of successful decisions of similar problems sharing family 
resemblance to the current one as one or more relevant values possibly contradicting to each 
other therefore needing the free will of the community as an arbiter between them.  
Even more, the actors (especially in Modernity) are not committed to follow the welded 
value field, but they are able to create new values or legal norms ad hoc to justify any choice 
contradicting the tradition. The capability of innovation is heralded a special kind of meta-
value specific to the contemporary epoch therefore obeying, or politically contrary to 
tradition as radicalism to conservatism: 
Radicalism determines a wider “window” of admissible historical and political choices, 
therefore deviating more from the most probable choice, and conservatism, on the contrary, 
shrinks it. Conservatism governs, as a rule, in the periods of continuity, in which the past 
predetermines the future crucially, even causally, and essentials choices or changes are not 
necessary, most probably even harmful.  
And vice versa: radicalism dominates during “revolutions”, historical discontinuity 
meaning the necessity of fundamental innovations due to very changed or forthcoming to 
change circumstances. Then, the law of least choice implies or might be interpreted as that 
historical pathway as less radical as possible. Radicalism seems to be a “necessary evil” 
admissible if and only if it is proved to be necessary: conservatism does not need any 
justification, but radicalism does always.  
However, the reverse error is much more often in the real human history: conservatism 
continues to dominate regardless of the obvious necessity of changes, due to which they are 
delayed sometimes fatally, causing the extinction or obedience of human communities.  
The law of least choice claims to supply the historical actors with an objective criterion 
for the necessity of change, withal quantitative, formal and mathematical.               
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XV INTERPRETATIONS OF “LEAST CHOICE” 
The concept of “least choice” means the quantity of information or quantum information, 
to which all possible situations of uncertainty resolvable by decision can be reduced 
regardless of their qualitative diversity.   
A problem both theoretical and practical is how one would be to determine the quantity 
of information, respectively, that of least choice as to real historical events. In general, it 
depends on the relative probability of a certain choice to the most probable one. The closer 
is the probability of the choice at issue to the maximal one in the given state of value field, 
the less is the choice, i.e. the closer is it to the state of maximal probability or “least choice”. 
To be utilizable practically, one needs: (1) the fan of all probable choices and decisions 
available in a certain historical problem; (2) their probability according the correspondence 
to the then or current value field; (3) the exclusion of the most probable ones among them 
due to the changed or forthcoming to change external circumstances. At last (4), the 
determination of those, relevant to the new circumstances, which are most probable 
according to the current value field. One should mean furthermore the difference between 
the estimation of the researchers historians post factum from that of the real actors, ex-ante.  
So, the latter is crucial for the relevance of made decision, respectively choice.  
One can illustrate the described algorithm by the discussed already investigation of Fogel 
about the railroads. The quantity of social saving of the development of railroads to the 
counterfactual pathway to be developed the existing  then transport demonstrates that (1) 
there have exist external obstacles for the latter or that (2) the innovation of railroads 
corresponds better to the then values therefore conditioning to be preferred, or (3) any 
combination of both. 
The examples is directed, first of all, to make clear that the law of least choice combines 
the subjective historical causality in (2) with the objective one in (1) in a single and 
inseparable whole of historical choice. 
A fundamental methodological idea of mathematical history consists in that unification 
of “object” and “subject” in history, borrowed from quantum mechanics: one of the greatest 
contribution to the epistemology of classical science where they are disjunctively separated 
from each other resulting as the “transparency” of the apparatus as on the fundamental 
distinguishability of objective probability from subjective probability. Quantum mechanics 
was forced to reject both, furthermore embedded in its formalism lent to mathematical history 
in the present research. 
Thus, the corresponding merging of subject and object in history is intended by 
mathematical history due to the utilization of the same mathematical structure; and vice 
versa: the eventual necessity to be merged the epistemological subject and object in history 
justifies the mathematical history able to do it.       
“Subject” and “object” in history, and then explicated in mathematical history, are merged 
in the concept of choice therefore postulating to be fundamental. There exists choice, there 
is choice, which can be embodied as in a human decision as in its limitation by external 
circumstances as well as any combination of the former and the latter. The mathematization 
of history implies and follows from their indistinguishability. That property of mathematical 
history can be understood also as the initial sense and motivation to be established.  
So, the interpretation of the law of least choice means that subjective and objective choice 
cannot be separated or distinguished from each other in the “least choice” .      
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XVI TO THE COEXISTENCE OF FREE WILL AND NECESSITY IN 
MATHEMATICAL HISTORY 
The crucial dependence on free will in history, being furthermore a humanitarian science, 
is obvious. There exist two fundamental ways for it to be available in history: in the decisions 
of actors as well as in the interpretations of historical discourse. Hermeneutics especially 
Gadamer’s justifies its foundation by their unification. Mathematical history accepts it as 
well, however linking it to physical and mathematical transcendentalism rather than only to 
philosophical and historical transcendentalism as the original hermeneutics might be 
interpreted to do.  
On the other hand, physics (before quantum mechanics) and mathematics as well as all 
the classic, rigorous, experimental or empiric science is based on the postulate of the 
necessity of scientific truths, only discovered by humans later or earlier. The opposition of 
free will and necessity is unified with another fundamental modern opposition of human 
being to nature identifying both former members and both latter members separately and then 
opposing them to each other as human free will to the necessity of nature: furthermore, the 
last opposition is relevant to the classical philosophical transcendentalism. 
History as an objective science tries to distinguish disjunctively the area of free will 
limited only ex-ante and only to the historical actors from that of necessity kept only post 
factum and only to historians by means of the concept of historical fact granting it as an 
objective fact by itself and regardless of any interpretation, discourse or narrative added only 
externally and accidentally to it, and therefore, similar enough to any fact of classical science 
allowing for truth to be understood as adequacy. 
However, philosophical and historical hermeneutics rejects that postulate of historical 
fact revising it to be as interpretable in many ways as merged with its interpretation 
inseparably. Rather paradoxically, but only at first glance, that merging is relevant to the 
establishment of mathematical history by involving the mathematical formalism of quantum 
mechanics as this is demonstrated in the paper. 
There exists theorems in quantum mechanics (Conway, Kochen 2006; 2008) called by 
their authors “free will theorems” inferring them from a few mathematical statements valid 
in quantum mechanics and special relativity. The philosophical interpretation of them coined 
by the authors themselves consists in the following conclusion. If the enumerated premises 
hold, and the experimenter (i.e. human being) in the area of quantum mechanics possesses 
free will, the investigated quantum entity (such as an electron, for example) has to possess 
free will in the same rigorous, physical and mathematical meaning as the experimenter26.   
In fact, that solution of the philosophical problem of the relation or coexistence of free 
will and necessity, implied by the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics and special 
relativity, is fundamentally different from that underlying the epistemological and 
ontological foundations of classical mechanics. Unlike the latter, it distinguishes two 
different oppositions, free will versus necessity, on the one hand, and human being versus 
necessity, on the other hand, allowing for any quantum entity to possess free will in the same 
meaning as a human being. 
                                                            
26 Without being proved formally and mathematically, that shocking corollary from quantum 
mechanics has been known since a long time ago, also being in the base of Einstein’s non-acceptance 
of quantum mechanics (Einstein 1926@)   
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The modus tollens of the same interpretation would be: if the investigated quantum entity 
does not possess free will (as classical science would agree), the experimenter (i.e. a human 
being) does not possess free will as well (which classical science would reject). Those 
theorems demonstrate that the solutions of quantum mechanics and classical science are 
diametrically opposed to each other in a sense elucidated above. 
Sharing the same formalism with quantum mechanics, mathematical history accepts the 
relevant premises for the free will theorems, and originating from it. The validity of those 
originating from special relativity can be justified as follows: 
History takes place in the physical world therefore obeying its laws, particularly those of 
special relativity, and its formalism is to be interpretable after mathematical history. Thus, 
the premises originating from both quantum mechanics and special relativity can be related 
not less to mathematical history, and the validity of the free will theorems be reaffirmed in 
its scope as well.  
The sense of the free will theorems as to mathematical history would be: the free will of 
the actors in history (i.e. human free will) implies the existence of “choice at all”, “subjectless 
choice”, (i.e. choice of the being or the universe). In other words, if the “subject” in a 
philosophical sense is able to choose, the relevant “object” is able not less, and thus, all in 
the totality and the totality itself. Then, the converse statement built by means of modus 
tollens holds as well: 
If the “object” obeys necessity, particularly natural necessity, the subject, particularly 
human being, also does, and all in the totality as well as the totality itself obeys necessity or 
natural necessity. Both viewpoints to the relation of free will (freedom) and necessity are 
admissible equally, but this does not imply any contradiction (unlike classical science) as 
they are dual or complementary to each other in the sense of quantum mechanics suggested 
by Niels Bohr. 
That kind of solution of the fundamental philosophical problem (at least as to the Western 
classical philosophy) about the relation of free will (freedom) and necessity) originates still 
from the quantum neo-Pythagoreanism postulating for the base of the world or the being to 
be mathematical and embodied in Hilbert arithmetic and in the qubit Hilbert space, and 
borrowed by mathematical history: 
Hilbert arithmetic as a triple of Peano arithmetics or respectively bits of classical 
information represent the one dual aspect of the opposition “free will (freedom) – necessity”, 
namely the latter: necessity; and accordingly, the other dual aspect (that of the qubit Hilbert 
space” means free will and freedom. However, neither of both aspects can be assigned 
unambiguously to “subject” (respectively, “object”) once the totality has been involved for 
it merges them definitively: for example, choice is both subjective and objective in 
mathematical history and quantum mechanics since the totality is a necessary condition 
(though often, implicit) for each of them to be established and embedded in the mathematical 
formalism shared by both.  
The relation of free well (freedom) and necessity in history can be visualized even only 
by the concept of hermeneutical circle27. The circle seen “inside” suggests many alternatives 
of both historical decisions ex-ante and their interpretations post factum. That external 
                                                            
27 It satisfies the fundamental, formal and logical tautology as this was demonstrated in the text 
already. 
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viewpoint means the involvement of actors and interpreters in the single historical fact as an 
“atom” of history as it is, seen “outside”, without “empathy” to the taken place, but 
“objectively”. The former corresponds to the one dual aspect, that of free will (freedom); and 
the latter, to the other one, that of necessity.  
Both aspects can be merged only in the totality therefore involving historical and 
mathematical transcendentalism necessary for mathematical history or serving as its 
justification in the discourse of foundation.    
      XVII INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION: WHAT MATHEMATICAL HISTORY STUDIES 
Mathematical history can be seen in three dissimilar ways from three fundamentally 
different viewpoints: (1) as a Pythagorean philosophy of history from the viewpoint of 
historical and mathematical transcendentalism; (2) as a theoretical history establishing 
general laws such as that of least choice from the viewpoint of the mathematical formalism 
borrowed from quantum mechanics; and (3), as a methodology for historical research after 
the interpretation of that mathematical formalism in properly historical and/ or social terms. 
So, mathematical history unifies the study in those three directions, which will be considered 
in detail: 
1. The fundamental ontology, however interpreted to be neo-numerical (in fact, 
substituting the Pythagorean sacral “number” by the contemporary profane “mathematical 
structure”) by itself, implies for the “regional ontology” of history to be the same and thus 
numerical as well. Mathematical history originates from that historical ontology, and the way 
in which this is possible is researched by relevant, i.e. neo-Pythagorean philosophy of history.  
A “peculiarity” featuring the relation of the fundamental ontology and historical ontology 
is inherited in mathematical history as a philosophy of history from all philosophical 
doctrines originating from transcendentalism or relevant to the conception of the totality. 
This is the aspect of identity or duality of the fundamental ontology and the regional historical 
ontology28, exemplifiable by the identity of philosophical transcendentalism with historical 
and mathematical transcendentalism29 as in the interpretation of historical dialectics or 
historical hermeneutics described above.  
The cyclic structure of the totality meant by the fundamental, formal and logical tautology 
(e.g. after physical and mathematical transcendentalism) can be interpreted as embodying the 
wholeness (or the “totality”) of history into any historical decision by its actors or any 
                                                            
28 Probably, Hegel was the first great philosopher who demonstrated convincingly that his dialectics 
(originating from transcendentalism, in fact) can be interpreted as history therefore able to unify 
history of philosophy and philosophy of history.   
29 Historical and mathematical transcendentalism is meant only here as a doctrine of philosophy and 
history, thus unfalsifiable: on the contrary, the same concept, “historical and mathematical 
transcendentalism” designated a scientific hypothesis, and thus, falsifiable by rejecting facts or by 
formal and logical inconsistency. The single, but very essential difference between the two uses of 
“historical ad mathematical transcendentalism consists only in adding the consistent and independent 
property of falsifiability, respectively of non-falsifiability. The latter is a crucial disadvantage for any 
scientific theory, but a necessary condition for many metaphysical theories interpreted usually as 
philosophical. The transition between them can be accomplished, for example, by the interpretation 
of the fundamental, formal and logical tautology as a proper logical tautology, thus true identically 
(or “analytically” after transcendentalism) or as a definitive property of the totality meant in the 
“regional ontology” of mathematical history (or “synthetically”) as far as the totality admits synthetic 
statements referring to it a priori.    
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interpretation of history by its researches. Any of both involves a choice, and in virtue of this, 
information.   
2. Mathematical history underlain by a very well elaborated mathematical formalism 
withal exceptionally successfully utilized by quantum mechanics allows for rigorous and thus 
testable laws of history, however absolutely inaccessible as to the usual historical research 
being fundamentally descriptive.  
An example is the law of least choice inferable from the conservation of quantum 
information and discussed in the paper.  
Furthermore, exact mathematical equivalents of unobservable and hypothetical histories 
such as counterfactual histories can be suggested as observed elements or collection in the 
real history: such as states of value field.   
3. An absolutely certain methodology for historical research (especially as to 
counterfactual ones) is deducible from mathematical history. Its main objectivities are to 
reveal the methods by which one can suggest mathematical equivalents (such as “wave 
functions” or states of “value fields”) of historical processes in different cultures and 
civilizations or to resolve the converse problem: which the interpretations of the elements of 
certain wave functions would be in terms of the usual historical discourse.  
So, mathematical history unifies and studies the relevant philosophy of history, of 
Pythagorean kind, mathematical models of theoretical history, and methodology of historical 
research. 
However, the present research, the subject of which is the foundations and justifications 
of mathematical of mathematical history first of all, is concentrated only to the first scope 
from the enumerated subareas though the examples in it can be related to the others. 
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